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Justice Murphy and the Fifth Amendment
Equal Protection Doctrine: A
Contribution Unrecognized
by MAmT w J. PERRY*
Justice Murphy's labors on the Supreme Court bore rich fruit.
In the decade of his association with the Court, he made a con-
tribution that will forever be enshrined in the hearts of those
devoted to the preservation and advancement of individual lib-
erties. Time and again he spoke eloquently on behalf of the
constitutional and legal rights of the accused, the unpopular, and
the oppressed. Sometimes he spoke on behalf of the Court,
sometimes for a minority of the Court, and not infrequently he
spoke alone. But always he reflected a humane and an under-
standing sense of justice.
His forthright and eloquent defense of the rights of noncon-
forming individuals and groups, and his burning condemnation
of racism, long will cheer and inspire defenders of freedom in a
troubled world. His ability to rise above the popular passions of
the moment to affirm the eternal virtues of freedom despite the
transient emotions engendered by crisis and war will long stand
as an example of judicial fearlessness.1
* Clerk to Chief Justice Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Vermont Supreme Court; B.A., Aqui-
nas College, 1994; M.A., Wayne State University, 1996; J.D., University of Michigan Law
School, 1999. My warmest gratitude is due to Professors Eugene Gressman and Sidney
Fine for all their help and encouragement throughout this project, as well as for their untir-
ing efforts to celebrate and preserve Justice Murphy's legacy. Appreciation also goes out
to former Supreme Court clerks who answered my many research inquiries: Messrs. John
H. Pickering, Richard J. Flynn, and Bennett Boskey, and Judge Eugene H. Nickerson.
Professor Thomas A. Green, who graciously served as my faculty advisor on this article
and mentor throughout law school, and Professor Richard D. Friedman, who provided
substantive commentary on a draft, and Dean Jeffrey S. Lehman, who supported my work
on Justice Murphy while at MLS, also deserve my appreciation. Finally, heartfelt thanks to
my many family members and friends - particularly my classmates at U-M - who patiently,
if not attentively at least in appearance, listened to my constant rambling over the years
about Justice Murphy.
1. 340 U.S. xii-xiii (1950). These statements are excerpted from the unanimously-
adopted Resolution of the Bar of the Supreme Court, read into the U.S. Reports by U.S.
Solicitor General Philip B. Perlman on March 6,1951, followed by the statements of Attor-
ney General J. Howard McGrath and Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson. See 340 U.S. pp. v-
xxv. Justice Murphy died on July 19, 1949. See 338 U.S. iii-iv, vii (1949).
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To the Justice's admirers, this eloquent description of Frank Mur-
phy's legacy is altogether fitting and proper. Of the hundreds of Mur-
phy opinions spanning the Justice's nine-year tenure on the United
States Supreme Court (1940-49),2 perhaps none - when viewed in his-
torical perspective - better highlights "[h]is ability to rise above the
popular passions of the moment to affirm the eternal virtues of free-
dom despite the emotions engendered by crisis and war ' 3 than four
critical cases decided during World War II.
In Hirabayashi v. United States (1943), 4 Korematsu v. United
States (1944),' and Ex parte Endo (1944),6 Justice Frank Murphy con-
curred, dissented, and concurred, respectively, to the United States
Supreme Court's opinions upholding World War II curfew restrictions
and exclusion programs imposed on all persons of Japanese ancestry
living on the West Coast.7 In Hirabayashi, Murphy stated that the
race-based curfew "dangerously approached" violating the Fifth
Amendment because the discrimination was of "such an injurious
character in the application of laws as to amount to a denial of due
process."8 In Korematsu, Murphy argued that the exclusion of all Jap-
anese peoples went "over 'the very brink of constitutional power,'
depriving "all of those within its scope of the equal protection of the
laws as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment."9 Finally, in Endo,
while agreeing with the Court's decision to order the release of an
American citizen who had proven her loyalty, Justice Murphy reiter-
ated his belief that detaining people of Japanese ancestry was "but...
2. During his tenure on the Court, Justice Murphy "wrote 217 opinions, about 70 of
which may be placed in the broad category of civil liberties." HAROLD NORRIS, MR. Jus-
TICE MuRP-Y AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 3 (1965). In all, Justice Murphy wrote 128 major-
ity, 20 concurring, and 69 dissenting opinions. See id. app. c at 523-42.
3. See Resolution, supra note 1, at xii-xiii.
4. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
5. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
6. 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
7. These measures took place pursuant to Executive Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg.
1407 (1942) and the Act of March 21, 1942, 56 Stat. 173, 18 U.S.C.A. § 97a, and were
carried out by U.S. Army Lt. General J. L. DeWitt and the War Relocation Authority. The
measures authorized military officials to impose a curfew and to remove "all persons" of
Japanese ancestry from the West Coast. More than 100,000 Americans of Japanese ances-
try - two-thirds of them native-born citizens - were removed to "relocation centers" in
isolated desert and swamp areas. The two most comprehensive works on these actions are
JACOBUS TEN BROEK, EDWARD N. BARNHART, FLOYD W. MATSON, PREJUDICE, WAR,
AND THE CONSTrru=ON (1954) and PETER H. IRONS, JUsTIcE AT WAR: Tim STORY OF
Tim JAPANESE AMERicAN INTERNmENT CASES (1983). See also WILLIAM H. REINQUIST,
ALL Tim LAWS BUT ONE: Crvn. LIBERTIES IN WARTRME 184-211 (1998).
8. 320 U.S. at 112 (Murphy, J., concurring).
9. 323 U.S. at 233, 235 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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another example of the unconstitutional resort to racism inherent in
the entire evacuation program."'1
On the same day the Court handed down Korematsu and Endo,
the Justices decided Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co." In this
case, Justice Murphy's concurrence implored the Court to use the
Constitution - in particular the Fifth Amendment - to strike down a
railroad union's discriminatory representation of African-American
workers.' 2
Justice Murphy's opinions in these four critical cases has spawned
a great deal of commentary. Murphy's Hirabayashi concurrence has
been called "[t]he one discordant note in Murphy's opposition to ra-
cism""3 and several writers have attempted to explain and atone for
his concurrence.' 4 Murphy's Korematsu dissent has been universally
lauded as "one of democracy's great documents"' 5 and history has
10. 323 U.S. at 307 (Murphy, J., concurring).
11. 323 U.S. 192 (1944). That historic day was December 18, 1944. Although the case
was argued later than Korematsu and Endo, Steele appears one case ahead of them in the
Supreme Court Reporter.
12. See infra note 157.
13. See Eugene Gressman, Mr. Justice Murphy - A Preliminary Appraisal, 50 COLUM.
L. REv. 29, 36 (1950). Professor Gressman was one of Justice Murphy's most devoted law
clerks, serving at the Supreme Court for him from 1943-48. His five-year term as law clerk
remains the longest in the modem history of Supreme Court law clerks.
14. The most comprehensive explanation of Murphy's concurring opinion is Sidney
Fine's Mr. Justice Murphy and the Hirabayashi Case, 33 PACIFIC HIST. RPv. 195 (1964).
See also, John P. Frank, Justice Murphy: The Goals Attempted, 59 YALE L. J. 1, 11 (1949)
("The Court unanimously upheld the order against the challenge that it denied due pro-
cess, but Murphy concurred specially to emphasize how limited was his acquiescence.");
John H. Pickering, A Tribute to Justice Frank Murphy, 73 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 703,715
(1996) ("Justice Murphy regretfully concurred in upholding the curfew order [in Hiraba-
yashi], but he vigorously dissented from the subsequent exclusion order removing all citi-
zens of Japanese ancestry from the west coast [in Korematsu]."); Alfred L. Scanlon, The
Passing of Justice Murphy - The Conscience of a Court, XXV NOT=E DAME LAWYER 7,23
(1949) ("[W]hile he concurred reluctantly in Hirabayashi v. United States, .. . he publicly
proclaimed the prickings of his sensitive conscience and the uneasy apprehensions that
must have possessed him.. ."); Byron F. Lindsley, Note, Constitutional Liberties of Japa-
nese-Americans as Affected by the War, 32 GEo. L. J. 183, 191 (1944) ("Mr. Justice Mur-
phy's concurring opinion so limited his assent that, in effect, it amounted to a dissent.").
15. Letter of Norman Thomas to Frank Murphy (January 6, 1945), reprinted in Sm-
NEY FINE, FRANK MURPHY: THE WASHINGTON YEARs 450 (1985) and J. WOODFORD
HowARD, JR., MR. JusTIcE MuRPHY: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 337 (1968). See also Eu-
gene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases - A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489, 503
(1945)("In a bewildering and unimpressive series of opinions, relieved only by the dissents
of Mr. Justice Roberts and of Mr. Justice Murphy in Korematsu v. United States, the Court
chose to assume that the main issue of the cases - the scope and method of the judicial
review of military decisions - did not exist."). Professor Fine's monumental three-volume
biography of Murphy should be the starting point for anyone interested in "Michigan's
Leading Citizen." Professor Howard's much shorter biography is also valuable. For a con-
Winter 20001
246 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 27:243
generally affirmed the dissent's correctness.16 The Endo concurrence
has been included as one of the "best example[s] of Justice Murphy's
ability to get the big ones right."'1 7 The Steele concurrence is a staple
of labor law and Murphy's candid, passionate condemnation of the
racism at play in the case has also drawn much praise. 8
None of the wartime opinions nor any other commentary or judi-
cial opinion, however, has taken notice of the key doctrinal aspect of
Justice Murphy's opinions: the opinions represent the first time a Su-
preme Court Justice not only suggested, but recognized and then ap-
plied an equal protection guarantee, through use of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, to federal governmental action which
affected civil rights and liberties. The Supreme Court failed to ac-
knowledge Murphy's insight in the landmark decision, Bolling v.
Sharpe (1954), 19 which adopted similar Fifth Amendment Equal Pro-
tection analysis. Academic commentators have also failed to clearly
credit Justice Murphy's important contributions. Recognition of Jus-
tice Murphy's key contribution to the adoption of Fifth Amendment
Equal Protection analysis is long overdue. Murphy's opinions in the
Japanese-American Cases2" and Steele played a significant role in shap-
ing the United States' jurisprudence.
cise biography of Murphy, see Peter Irons' account in Tim SUPREME COURT JuSTIcES: A
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 331-36 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1994).
16. In 1984, a federal district judge vacated Fred Korematsu's conviction. See Kore-
matsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984). The Ninth Circuit likewise
overturned Gordon Hirabayashi's curfew conviction in 1987. See Hirabayashi v. United
States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987). See also Joel B. Grossman, THE JAPANESE AMERICAN
CASES AND THE VAGARIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION IN WARTIME: AN INSTI-
TUTIONAL PERSPEcTIvE, 19 U. HAw. L. R. 649, 663-68 (1997). In 1988, Congress imple-
mented the recommendations of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment
of Civilians by acknowledging, much in the same language of Murphy's opinions, the "fun-
damental injustice of the evacuation, relocation and internment" of the Japanese-Ameri-
cans during WWII. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 639, 611 (12th ed.,
1991). See also PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIm CONVICTIONS 46-49 (1988).
17. See Pickering, supra note 14, at 708.
18. See, e.g., Madelyn C. Squire, The National Labor Relations Act and Union's Invidi-
ous Discrimination - A Case Review of a Would Be Constitutional Issue, 30 How. L. J. 783,
785-86 ("What is quite interesting in Steele with significant future implications is Justice
Murphy's concurring opinion excoriating the Court for not addressing the grave constitu-
tional ramifications the Brotherhood's discriminatory conduct had on minority craft mem-
bers and deciding the issue solely on a statutory basis ..... Justice Murphy's opinion and
later civil rights cases provided the material to fashion an argument in Black workers'
struggle for economic parity.").
19. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
20. This term collectively refers to Hirabayashi, Korematsu, and Endo. The several
other war-time Supreme Court cases that affected Japanese-Americans should not be in-
cluded under this term.
A CONTRIBUTION UNRECOGNIZED
In some ways, this article puts the proverbial cart-before-the-
horse. The article starts at the end of the story, as Part I analyzes the
history of the Fifth Amendment Equal Protection doctrine and fo-
cuses on its adoption by the Court in Chief Justice Warren's Boiling
opinion. Part II turns the clock back and looks closely at the cases
which led to the adoption of Boiling, in particular focusing on Justice
Murphy's opinions in the Japanese-American Cases and Steele. Part
III examines the influence that Justice Murphy's opinions had on ad-
vocates who argued cases before the Court and challenged the federal
government's role in racial discrimination leading up to and including
the facts of Boiling. Finally, Part IV is a brief biographical sketch of
Justice Murphy, going all the way back to his upbringing. The biogra-
phy helps explain why Justice Murphy was uniquely suited to endorse
the Fifth Amendment Equal Protection doctrine. Although the road
is long and winding, the examination of both Justice Murphy's life and
jurisprudence will hopefully leave readers with a new appreciation for
the lasting contributions Justice Murphy made to Fifth Amendment
Equal Protection analysis.
I. Boiling v. Sharpe: The Court Adopts Fifth Amendment
Equal Protection
As early as 1921, the Court indicated that there was an argument
for a Fifth Amendment Equal Protection doctrine.21 These sugges-
21. See La Belle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U.S. 368, 392 (1921) ("The Fifth
Amendment has no equal protection clause; and the only rule of uniformity prescribed
with respect to duties, imposts, and excises laid by Congress is the territorial uniformity
required by article 1, § 8."). The Court's longest exposition on Fifth Amendment Equal
Protection analysis during this early period came in Chief Justice Taft's majority opinion in
Truax v. Corrigan:
The due process clause brought down from Magna Charta was found in the early
state constitutions and later in the Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution
as a limitation upon the executive, legislative and judicial powers of the federal
Government, while the equality clause does not appear in the Fifth Amendment
and so does not apply to congressional legislation.... [The due process clause] of
course, tends to secure equality of law in the sense that it makes a required mini-
mum of protection for every one's right of life, liberty and property, which the
Congress or the legislature may not withhold. Our whole system of law is predi-
cated on the general fundamental principle of equality of application of the law.
'All men are equal before the law,' '[t]his is a government of laws and not of
men,' '[n1o man is above the law,' are all maxims showing the spirit in which
legislatures, executives and courts are expected to make, execute and apply laws.
But the framers and adopters of this amendment were not content to depend on a
mere minimum secured by the due process clause, or upon the spirit of equality
which might not be insisted on by local public opinion.
257 U.S. 312, 332 (1921). Lower federal courts had entertained the idea of Fifth Amend-
ment Equal Protection even before these early Supreme Court forays. See Sims v. Rives,
Wvinter 20001
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tions, however, appeared only in a series of economic cases where the
Court's discussion was mere obiter dictum.22 Moreover, in no case did
the Court actually adopt the doctrine, as Professor Kenneth L. Karst
succinctly described:
[T]he Court hinted in a series of dicta that the fifth amendment
might, after all, prohibit arbitrary federal discrimination. The
ritual recital in all these opinions was that "the Fifth [Amend-
ment] contains no equal protection clause" - as if the point
might otherwise escape even careful readers. But the Court
would go on, saying that it assumed for argument that federal
discrimination, if completely unjustified, might violate the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. At the same time, the
Court continued to assure us, the legislation before it did no
such thing.'
By 1954, however, the Court was ready to make this finding of
unjustified discrimination. In Bolling v. Sharpe,24 a companion case to
Brown v. Board of Education,25 a unanimous Court adopted Fifth
Amendment Equal Protection. In striking down segregated schools in
the District of Columbia, Chief Justice Warren's opinion stated:
The Fifth Amendment, which is applicable in the District of Co-
lumbia, does not contain an equal protection clause as does the
Fourteenth Amendment which applies only to the states. But
the concepts of equal protection and due process, both stem-
ming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually ex-
84 F.2d 871, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1936) ("The Fifth Amendment as applied to the District of
Columbia implies equal protection of the laws." (citation omitted)); United States v.
Yount, 267 F. 861, 863 (W.D. Pa. 1920) ("It seems reasonably clear that the 'due process of
law' provision of the Fifth Amendment is broad enough in its scope and purpose to include
the 'equal protection of the laws,' which no state may deny to any person under the provi-
sions of the Fourteenth Amendment."). See also Lappin v. District of Columbia, 22 App.
D.C. 68, 75-76 (D.C. Ct. App. 1903) ("It must be conceded that the 14th Amendment,
which expressly declares that no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws, does not purport to extend to authority exercised by the
United States. But it does not follow that Congress in exercising its power of legislation
within and for the District of Columbia may, therefore, deny to persons residing therein
the equal protection of the laws. All of the guaranties of the Constitution respecting life,
liberty, and property are equally for the benefit and protection of all citizens of the United
States residing permanently or temporarily within the District of Columbia, as of those
residing in the several States." (citations omitted)). All of the above cases were economic
cases. See infra note 22.
22. The term "economic cases" is used throughout this article to mean cases involving
commercial regulations or tax measures, as distinguished from those implicating what are
typically thought of as "civil rights and liberties cases." See infra note 65.
23. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55
N.C. L. REv. 541, 544 (1977).
24. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
25. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For the best coverage of Brown and Boiling, see RicHARD
KLUGER, SIMPLE JusTE (1975).
clusive. The 'equal protection of the laws' is a more explicit
safeguard of prohibited unfairness than 'due process of law,'
and, therefore, we do not imply that the two are always inter-
changeable phrases. But, as this Court has recognized, discrimi-
nation may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due
process.26
As Professor Karst observed in his seminal article on Fifth
Amendment Equal Protection, the "slate was far from blank when
Chief Justice Warren wrote for a unanimous Court"'27 in Boiling, for
that opinion "did not so much create the doctrine of fifth amendment
equal protection as ratify it."'28 To support this new doctrine, Chief
Justice Warren cited three precedents: Detroit Bank v. United States
(1943),29 Currin v. Wallace (1939),30 and Chas C. Steward Machine Co.
v. Davis (1937).31 These three cases all followed the "ritual recital"
pattern described by Professor Karst.32 In Detroit Bank, a tax lien
case, Chief Justice Stone stated that "[u]nlike the Fourteenth Amend-
ment the Fifth contains no equal protection clause and it provides no
guaranty against discriminatory legislation by Congress" and that
"[e]ven if discriminatory legislation may be so arbitrary and injurious
in character as to violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.., no such case is presented here."33 Currin involved an equal
protection challenge to the Tobacco Inspection Act. Chief Justice
Hughes, after stating that "[u]ndoubtedly, the exercise of the com-
merce power is subject to the Fifth Amendment, but that Amend-
ment, unlike the Fourteenth, has no equal protection clause," went on
to say that "[i]f it be assumed that there might be discrimination of
such an injurious character as to bring into operation the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment, that is a different matter from a con-
tention that mere lack of uniformity in the exercise of the commerce
power renders the action of Congress invalid."3 4 In Steward Machine,
a challenge to the constitutionality of the Social Security Act, Justice
Cardozo explained that while "[t]he Fifth Amendment unlike the
Fourteenth has no equal protection clause," the Court "assume[d] that
discrimination, if gross enough, is equivalent to confiscation and sub-
26. 347 U.S. at 497.
27. Karst, supra note 23, at 545.
28. Id. at 543.
29. 317 U.S. 329 (1943).
30. 306 U.S. 1 (1939).
31. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
32. Karst, supra note 23, at 544.
33. 317 U.S. at 337-38.
34. 306 U.S. at 14 (citations omitted).
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ject under the Fifth Amendment to challenge and annulment. '35 In
none of these economic cases did the Court either hold that a Fifth
Amendment Equal Protection guarantee existed or that the chal-
lenged act violated such a protection if it did exist.36
Boiling went on to state that "[c]lassifications based solely upon
race must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary
to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect,"37 citing the ma-
jority opinions in Hirabayashi and Korematsu.38 The "irony" of citing
these cases to support this proposition has not been lost on commen-
tators, especially Professor Karst.39 After all, both Hirabayashi and
Korematsu upheld the racial classifications based on Japanese ancestry
and the Court hardly utilized the "scrutin[y] with particular care ' '4 0
that Boiling suggests. Thus, on their faces, these opinions are not par-
ticularly firm precedents upon which to base this new doctrine. More-
over, as will be shown below, the history behind the opinions suggests
that they are perhaps even weaker than their equivocal language
might appear.
Murphy's opinions in the Japanese-American Cases and Steele
would have provided direct support for Bolling's bold move. Why
then did Chief Justice Warren fail to cite them in his opinion as a
means of bolstering his adoption of the doctrine? 41 It is plausible that
35. 301 U.S. at 584, 585.
36. Other cases not cited in Boiling follow this pattern. See, e.g., Helvering v. Lerner
Stores Co., 314 U.S. 463,468 (1941) (tax case in which Justice Douglas wrote for the major-
ity that "[a] claim of unreasonable classification or inequality in the incidence or applica-
tion of a tax raises no question under the Fifth Amendment which contains no equal
protection clause."); Sunshine Anthacite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 401 (1940) (tax
case in which Justice Douglas wrote for the majority "[b]ut the Fifth Amendment, unlike
the Fourteenth, has no equal protection clause .... And there is 'no requirement of
uniformity in connection with the commerce power."' (citation omitted)); United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 151 (1938) (Commerce Clause challenge to a federal
law prohibiting the interstate shipment of "filled milk" in which Justice Stone wrote for the
majority "[t]he Fifth Amendment has no equal protection clause, and even that of the
Fourteenth, applicable only to the states, does not compel their legislatures to prohibit all
like evils, or none. A legislature may hit at an abuse which it has found, even though it has
failed to strike at another."). See Karst, supra note 23, at 544 n.13.
37. 347 U.S. at 499.
38. Id. at 499 n.3.
39. See Karst, supra note 23, at 546 n.28 ("The irony in the drawing the Boiling result
from Gibson thus surpasses even the irony in relying on Hirabayashi.").
40. 347 U.S. at 499.
41. It is difficult here not to point out the perhaps not-so-coincidental irony in his
speech, "A Tribute to Justice Frank Murphy" before the University of Detroit Mercy Law
School's Justice Frank Murphy Honor Society, Mr. John H. Pickering, Justice Murphy's
law clerk from 1941-43, made this comparison: "Murphy's insistence on justice and fair-
ness produced a pun on Milton's phrase, "temper justice with mercy" - to some critics, this
A CONTRIBUTION UNRECOGNIZED
Warren did not want to rely on concurring or dissenting opinions in a
controversial decision like Boiling. For example, although Brown ba-
sically overruled Plessy v. Ferguson,42 nowhere in Brown did Warren
cite Justice John Marshall Harlan's great dissent in Plessy,43 despite
the fact that Brown essentially vindicated and adopted Harlan's posi-
tion.' It could be that as a legal strategy, Warren simply felt more
comfortable relying on the majority opinions in Detroit Bank, Currin,
Steward Machine, and the Japanese-American Cases for the very fact
that they were majority opinions, which he could - whether convinc-
ingly or not - marshal to support his Fifth Amendment Equal Protec-
tion holding with the full weight of the Court's precedential authority.
Perhaps this explains why Warren quoted Harlan's statement
from his unanimous majority opinion in Gibson v. Mississippi4' that
"the Constitution of the United States, in its present form, forbids, so
far as civil and political rights are concerned, discrimination by the
General Government, or by the states, against any citizen because of
his [or her] race."46 Warren string-cited Stone's Steele opinion to sup-
became "Justice tempered with Murphy!" In his emphasis on fairness, Murphy was a pre-
cursor for Chief Justice Warren's insistent questioning of counsel - "Is it fair?," a question
which counsel often found difficult to answer." See supra note 14, at 704 (emphasis added).
Professor G. Edward White made a similar comparison in his biography, EARL WARREN:
A PUBLIC L'nE (1982): "The only other Supreme Court justice who approached Warren's
jurisprudential posture was Frank Murphy.. . ." Id. at 359. This is particularly interesting
when one looks closely at Warren's language in Bolling: "But the concepts of equal pro-
tection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutu-
ally exclusive. The 'equal protection of the laws' is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited
unfairness than 'due process of law,' and, therefore, we do not imply that the two are
always interchangeable phrases. But, as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be
so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process." 347 U.S. at 499 (emphasis added).
42. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
43. Id. at 552-64.
44. See 347 U.S. at 494-95 ("Whatever may have been the extent of psychological
knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern
authority. Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.").
45. 162 U.S. 565 (1896).
46. 347 U.S. at 499 (quoting Gibson, 162 U.S. at 591). Gibson addressed an allegation
of discrimination brought against the state of Mississippi in its jury selection for the murder
trial of a black man accused of killing a white man. Harlan's opinion entertained the pro-
position that discrimination by both the "General Government" and the states is forbidden
by the Constitution:
All citizens are equal before the law. The guarantees of life, liberty and property
are for all persons, within the jurisdiction of the United States, or of any State,
without discrimination against any because of their race. Those guarantees, when
their violation is properly presented in the regular course of proceedings, must be
enforced in the courts, both of the nation and of the state, without reference to
considerations based upon race.
162 U.S. at 591. Professor Karst, however, observed that Bolling's reliance on this prece-
dent was "shaky," citing the "hollow[ness]" of such a "pious statement [of] (dictum as to
Winter 2000
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port this quote. It is striking that the Steele language that Warren
cited was not nearly the strongest support for Fifth Amendment Equal
Protection he could have found in Stone's opinion, to say nothing of
the much stronger case that could have been made using Murphy's
concurrence to supplement the creation of Fifth Amendment Equal
Protection doctrine.4' Warren, however, probably felt that Stone's
opinion in Steele, with a solid eight-man majority behind it, was strong
enough to justify Boiling. Warren, therefore, simply added this cita-
tion to throw a little more modern authority behind his somewhat
"shaky"4 Gibson citation.
However plausible this argument, it seems likely that there is
more to the story. More personal motivations probably explain War-
ren's failure to mention Murphy's contributions to the Fifth Amend-
ment Equal Protection doctrine, especially in light of Murphy's
opinions in the Japanese-American Cases.49
It is likely that Warren's failure to mention Justice Murphy's
Hirabayashi, Korematsu, or Endo opinions was not an accident. One
must remember that, as California's Attorney General and Governor
during World War II, Warren was a "vital moving force in the formu-
lation of the Japanese relocation program... [who] more than fully
cooperat[ed] with the military... [as] the most visible and effective
California public official advocating internment and evacuation of the
American Japanese."50 Thus, it seems only natural that Warren would
not be inclined to cite Murphy's opinions - especially his passionate
condemnation in Korematsu of the exclusion program's inherent ra-
cism - which called into question the constitutionality of these actions.
the federal government since the case involved a fourteenth amendment claim against a
state .... )." Karst, supra note 23, at 546 n.28. This point is well-taken, given that the Court
denied John Gibson's motion to remove the case to federal court despite the showing that
a jury pool consisting of 7000 blacks and 1500 whites produced a list of 200 whites selected
for the jury panel. Further, no black had served on a Mississippi grand jury for years. See
1d.
47. It appears that Warren was citing to Stone's statement explaining why the Court
did not have to reach the constitutional issue of Fifth Amendment Equal Protection:
But we think that Congress, in enacting the Railway Labor Act and authorizing a
labor union, chosen by a majority of a craft, to represent the craft, did not intend
to confer plenary power upon the union to sacrifice, for the benefit of its mem-
bers, rights of the minority of the craft, without imposing on it any duty to protect
the minority.
323 U.S. at 199.
48. See Karst, supra note 23.
49. It should be noted that the Earl Warren Papers at the Library of Congress contain
nothing that discusses Justice Murphy's opinions in these cases.
50. White, supra note 41, at 71.
Warren's personal stake in the legacy of these measures perhaps influ-
enced the failure to cite Murphy's scathing dissent.
Moreover, the fact that Warren did cite the majority opinions up-
holding the curfew restriction and exclusion order in the Japanese-
American Cases is even more revealing. As Mr. Richard J. Flynn, one
of the Chief Justice's law clerks that term recalled, Warren "defended
these [actions], so no citation to them would have been an affront to
him."'" That is, the majority citations were not offensive to Warren
because they reaffirmed the legality of the measures and, by exten-
sion, Warren's role in them. Mr. Flynn recollected that Warren was
"receptive to the [majority] cites we gave, but I didn't think we could
have pushed him any further. We didn't talk about the Exclusion
Cases with him. We knew better."52
Roger K. Newman shed more light on this line of thought in his
biography of Justice Hugo Black.53 Referring to the fact that Warren
altered his first draft opinion in Bolling, which included an argument
that segregation violated black children's substantive due process
rights to education, 4 Newman reported Justice William 0. Douglas'
recollection that "I think Black said something to Warren about those
[citations]," for Black rejected the substantive due process doctrine,
and urged the Chief to decide the case only on the racial discrimina-
tion at issue.55 In 1954, Black, the senior associate justice, made sev-
eral efforts to help the newly-appointed Chief Justice get
"comfortable in his new surroundings" and the two "spent much time
talking about the [desegregation] cases."56 If Douglas and Newman's
speculation is correct, then it is critically relevant that Black may have
influenced the fact that "[w]ith the flick of a wrist [Warren] changed
Bolling v. Sharpe from an education case into a race case."57 After all,
Black wrote the majority opinion in Korematsu. Although he "hate[d]
51. Telephone interview with Mr. Richard Flynn (June 19, 1998). Special thanks to
Mrs. Kay Flynn, who gave permission to use Mr. Flynn's helpful comments.
52. Id.
53. See ROGER K. NEwMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRaPHY (1994).
54. For an evolution of Boiling, see Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegrega-
tion: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948-58, 68 GEO. L. J. 1, 44-50 (1979). It is
interesting that one of the citations which Warren included in his original draft was Far-
rington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298-99 (1927), where the Court invalidated on Fifth
Amendment grounds territorial law restricting the operation of foreign language schools.
As discussed later, Justice Murphy had included Farrington in his original Hirabayashi
draft to support his Fifth Amendment Equal Protection argument, only to eliminate it.
55. NEWMAN, supra note 53, at 435.
56. Id. at 436.
57. Hutchinson, supra note 54, at 46.
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to write against civil liberties""8 and privately harbored doubts about
the constitutionality of the exclusion order, 9 Black stood by Kore-
matsu until his death.6" Like Warren, Black had a personal stake in
the exclusion measure's legacy, and he, too, would not wish to cast
doubt upon its legality by allowing Bolling to cite Murphy's Kore-
matsu dissent. Thus, Black may have encouraged Warren to cite to
Korematsu's majority statement that "all legal restrictions which cur-
tail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect"'"
as support for the result in Bolling and validation of the decision in
Korematsu.62 At the same time, it is likely that Black discouraged
Warren from citing Murphy's condemnation of the exclusion. For
both Black and Warren, citing Murphy's Japanese-American Cases in
Bolling would have tacitly admitted that their roles in the discrimina-
tory actions at issue were constitutionally suspect. Deciding these
cases, only ten years after World War II, neither man was willing to
publicly acknowledge such a mistake in Bolling.63 Perhaps Warren's
58. NEWMAN, supra note 53, at 316.
59. Id. at 315. Newman included this note:
Privately, however, very privately, Black harbored doubts. "He wasn't sure," re-
called George Reynolds (int.), "moving the Japanese was the right thing to do to
people who had lived in the country quite a long time, but he supported it on the
ground that you couldn't take any chances of domestic bombing in wartime. He
told me we shouldn't second-guess the President. Second-guess was the word he
used. He indicated that during a war the Court shouldn't exercise independent
judgment in the way it would otherwise. He also led me to believe that he
wouldn't have done that to the Japanese if he were President. He never criticized
Roosevelt, you have to remember. In his usual indirect way he said, 'If I were
President, I'm not sure I would have done that. These people are American citi-
zens and have lived here for a long time."'
Id.
60. See id. at 319. Newman reports one account recalled by Sidney Davis, Black's
clerk during the term of Korematsu: "[Black] said, 'Under those circumstances we did the
right things. Under those circumstances we couldn't have done anything else. I still think I
did the right thing."' Id.
61. 323 U.S. at 216.
62. It should be noted that an early Warren Memorandum on the District of Columbia
Case has a margin note penciled explaining that "[t]he 'equal protection of the laws' is
more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than 'due process of law,' and, therefore
we do not imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But discrimination may
be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process." Earl Warren Papers, Box 571. This
sentence basically survived intact to the final opinion. This sentence, however, was fol-
lowed by the substantive due process argument. See id. Thus, Black evidently had not yet
persuaded Warren to drop the substantive due process argument when this sentence was
added to the opinion.
63. Unlike Black, Warren did eventually change his mind about the internment pro-
gram. In THE MEMOIRS OF CHIEF JusTIcE EARL WARREN (1977), with the benefit of 35
years of reflection, he wrote: "I have since deeply regretted the removal order and my own
testimony advocating it, because it was not in keeping with our American concept of free-
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conspicuous failure to mention Murphy's Japanese-American Cases
opinions in Bolling is, therefore, somewhat understandable, though
nevertheless unfortunate.64
Whatever the reasons for the omission, the commonalties
amongst all of the cases that Bolling did cite - and indeed among all of
the cases which suggest a Fifth Amendment Equal Protection guaran-
tee - present two historically relevant points: 1) the cases were all,
with the exception of the Gibson, Steele, and the Japanese-American
Cases, economic cases which the post-1937 "Roosevelt Court" was un-
likely to uphold in favor of the parties claiming unconstitutional fed-
eral classifications; and 2) the language in these cases, which proposed
a Fifth Amendment Equal Protection doctrine was extremely equivo-
cal. Given the questionable rationales underlying these early Fifth
Amendment Equal Protection cases, the Justices who authored these
opinions should not receive exclusive credit for laying the critical link
in Bolling. It is only fair that Justice Murphy who recognized and ex-
pressly advocated the application of a Fifth Amendment Equal Pro-
tection guarantee against federal incursions on civil rights and
liberties,65 be given at least some credit for his role in the doctrine's
eventual adoption in Bolling.
dom and the rights of citizens.... It was wrong to react so impulsively without positive
evidence of disloyalty.. . ." Id. at 149.
64. It is especially unfortunate because Murphy would have been very proud to have
his opinions support such a decision. He was part of the per curiam Court that ordered the
state of Oklahoma to provide an African-American student with a legal education at a
state institution as it did for white students in Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631
(1948). Moreover, he was also apparently the only justice who declared his opposition to
the separate-but-equal doctrine and favored integrated education at the conference follow-
ing Sipuel. When the case came back before the Court in Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U.S. 147
(1948), because the student argued that Oklahoma's having set aside a section of the state
capitol and assigning three teachers to instruct her did not comply with the Court's instruc-
tions, Murphy dissented, as did Rutledge, from the Court's weak per curiam conclusion
that Oklahoma had complied with its mandate. See FiNm, Tim WASHINGTON YEARS, supra
note 15, at 563-65. Commentators noted Justice Murphy's commitment to ending the "sep-
arate-but-equal" doctrine upon his death. See Scanlon, supra note 14, at 23 ("Frank Mur-
phy joined informally with his close colleague, the late Justice Rutledge, in a dissent [in
Fisher] which indicated that had both lived, further judicial perpetration of the fallacious
"separate but equal" maxim would have had at least two dissenters. When that fantastic
fiction is finally wiped away, Justice Murphy's spirit, perhaps, will rest easier."); Frank,
supra note 14, at 15 ("It is no wonder that those engaged in litigation to end segregated
education believe that a major source of strength was lost by the unexpected death of
Justice Murphy.").
65. Throughout this article, the phrase "civil rights and liberties" is used somewhat
interchangeably and collectively to refer to those rights protecting citizens from govern-
mental discrimination and intrusions. It is generally understood that civil rights and civil
liberties are not exactly the same thing, with the Equal Protection Clause relating primarily
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Neither court opinions - with the possible exception of Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion in Adarand Constructors v. Pena
(1995)66 - nor academic commentary, however, has recognized Mur-
phy's contributions. Indeed, Professor Karst's article on Fifth
Amendment Equal Protection stated that "the critical opinion in this
series was written by Chief Justice Stone in Hirabayashi v. United
States,"67 ignoring Murphy's Hirabayashi concurrence entirely and
giving only cursory mention to his Korematsu dissent.68  Professor
Karst further observed that despite its unfortunate results, Stone's
Hirabayashi opinion "pointed the way to the adoption by the Court of
the doctrine of fifth amendment equal protection. '69 Other commen-
tators - with the possible exception of one author7° - have followed
to the former and the Due Process clause covering the latter. However, for simplification,
this article takes the liberty of grouping them together.
66. 515 U.S. 200, 214-15 (1995). In her discussion of the doctrine's history, Justice
O'Connor wrote:
Eighteen months later, the Court again approved wartime measures directed at
persons of Japanese ancestry. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 65 S. Ct.
193, 89 L. Ed. 194 (1944), concerned an order that completely excluded such per-
sons from particular areas. The Court did not address the view, expressed in cases
like Hirabayashi and Detroit Bank, that the Federal Government's obligation to
provide equal protection differs significantly from that of the States. Instead, it
began by noting that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single
racial group are immediately suspect ... [and] courts must subject them to the
most rigid scrutiny." 323 U.S., at 216, 65 S. Ct., at 194. That promising dictum
might be read to undermine the view that the Federal Government is under a
lesser obligation to avoid injurious racial classifications than are the States. Cf. id.,
at 234-235, 65 S. Ct., at 202 (Murphy, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe order deprives all
those within its scope of the equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the
Fifth Amendment").
Id This is the clearest reference to Justice Murphy's role in Fifth Amendment Equal Pro-
tection jurisprudence in the United States Reports, but it hardly constitutes the breadth of
recognition his contribution deserves.
67. Karst, supra note 23, at 544.
68. Id. at 545 ("[B]ut for Justice Murphy, the exclusion order was a deprivation 'of the
equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment."').
69. Id. at 544. See also KENNETH L. KARsT, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL Cm-
ZENSIP AND THE CONSTITUTION 91 (1989) ("Not all the lessons of Korermatsu are so dis-
mal. As a judicial precedent, the decision set the stage for two major egalitarian
developments that retain vigor today. One is the application of constitutional guarantees
of equality against the national government despite the absence of any explicit equal pro-
tection clause in the Bill of Rights.").
70. Professor James R. Kerr did recognize Bolling's disregard for Murphy's opinions
in his excellent and aptly titled article The Neglected Opinions of Mr. Justice Murphy, 1977
DEr. C.L. REv. 7 (1977). In his discussion of Murphy's jurisprudence on racial discrimina-
tion, Professor Kerr twice correctly observed:
Racial classifications were always suspect to Murphy, although Warren did not
announce that they were constitutionally suspect until Bolling v. Sharpe, which
repudiated racial segregation in the public schools of the District of Columbia.
Id. at 14.
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suit.71 The neglect of Justice Murphy's contributions to the adoption
of Fifth Amendment Equal Protection should be corrected. Murphy's
willingness to find an equal protection component in the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause and then apply the doctrine in a
civil rights and liberties context should be recognized and accorded
the historical praise it deserves.
In Boiling v. Sharpe, Warren said: "Classifications based solely on race must be
scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and
hence constitutionally suspect." This language is extremely close to that used by
Murphy in Hirabayashi and Oyama, but there are no references to Murphy's
opinions.
Id. at 16-17. This article essentially makes the same argument, but also presents a broader
explanation and provides a deeper background of Professor Kerr's sharp and succinct
statements.
71. See, e.g., David P. Currie, The Constitution and the Supreme Court: The Second
World War, 1941-1946, 37 CATH. U. L. Rv. 1, 19 (1987) (Therefore, in Justice Murphy's
[Korematsu] opinion, "the order deprive[d] all those within its scope of the equal protec-
tion of the laws as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. There is only one weakness in this
argument: There is no such provision."); Eugene Doherty, Equal Protection Under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments: Patterns of Congruence, Divergence, and Judicial Defer-
ence, 16 Omo N.U. L. Rv. 591, 596-98 (1989) (no mention of Murphy's opinions in its
discussion of the doctrine's history); Grossman, supra note 16, at 649 ("In a[n Adarand]
footnote O'Connor expressed clear sympathy with the Korematsu dissenters, especially
Murphy's condemnation of the orders as falling into the ugly abyss of racism."); Christine
Ann Lobasso, Elevation of the IndividuaL" International Legal Issues that Flow from the
American Internment of the West Coast Japanese During World War 11, 8 ToURo J. TRANs-
NAT'L L. 45,53 (1998) ("When Hirabayashi, Korematsu, and Endo were decided, Supreme
Court Justice Murphy wrote separately to sharply criticize the program of mass restriction,
exclusion, and eventual internment of West Coast residents of Japanese ancestry.");
Michael J. Perry, Brown, Boiling, & Originalism: Why Ackerman and Posner (Among
Others) are Wrong, 20 S. Ii. U. L. J. 53, 73 n.74 (1995) ("About ten years earlier, in
Hirabayashi v. United States, and then in the related, and notorious, case of Korematsu v.
United States, the Court first deployed its misreading of the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause to assess the constitutionality of action of the national government discriminating
against Americans of Japanese ancestry. Justice Murphy's dissenting opinion in Korematsu
argued that the military exclusion order at issue there "goes over 'the very brink of consti-
tutional power' and falls into the ugly abyss of racism." Murphy then claimed that in sus-
taining the order, the majority had participated in "the legalization of racism."); Russell N.
Watterson, Jr., Adarand Constructors v. Pena: Madisonian Theory as a Justification for
Lesser Constitutional Scrutiny of Federal Race Conscious Legislation, 1996 BYU L. REv.
301, 313-15 (1996) (no mention of Murphy's opinions in its discussion of the doctrine's
history); Mary J. Reyburn, Note, Strict Scrutiny Across the Board The Effect of Adarand
Constructors v. Pena on Race-Based Affirmative Action Programs, 45 CATH. U. L. Rlv.
1405, 1458 n.62 (1996) ("Justice Murphy dissented, arguing that the exclusionary order
'falls into the ugly abyss of racism.' He further stated, '[b]eing an obvious racial discrimi-
nation, the order deprives all those within its scope of the equal protection of the laws as
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment."') (citations omitted).
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II. The Road to Boiling
Although Professor Karst correctly observed that "[t]he slate
was.., far from blank when Chief Justice Warren wrote for a unani-
mous Court in Boiling v. Sharpe,"72 the critical opinions supporting
the adoption of the doctrine in civil rights cases were of a particular
and relatively recent vintage. Justice Murphy's opinions, as the fol-
lowing discussion argues, had an important role in this evolution.
A. Chief Justice Stone and Hirabayashi
In his majority opinion upholding the war curfew,73 Chief Justice
Stone discussed "whether the restriction unconstitutionally discrimi-
nated between citizens of Japanese ancestry and those of other ances-
tries in violation of the Fifth Amendment."'74 Stone's answer seemed
to imply that, although there may be an equal protection guarantee
implicit in the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, that protec-
tion was not violated by the curfew order:
The Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause and
it restrains only such discriminatory legislation by Congress as
amounts to a denial of due process. Detroit Bank v. United
States, 317 U.S. 329, 337-38, and cases cited. Congress may hit at
a particular danger where it is seen, without providing for others
which are not so evident or so urgent. Keokee Consol. Coke Co.
v. Taylor, 234 U.S. 224, 227.
Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry
are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institu-
tions are founded upon the doctrine of equality. For that rea-
son, legislative classification or discrimination based on race
alone has often been held to be a denial of equal protection.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356; Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271
U.S. 500; Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400. We may assume that these
considerations would be controlling here were it not for the fact
that the danger of espionage and sabotage, in time of war and of
threatened invasion, calls upon the military authorities to scruti-
nize every relevant fact bearing on the loyalty of populations in
the danger areas. Because racial discriminations are in most cir-
cumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited, it by no means
72. Karst, supra note 23, at 545.
73. Gordon Hirabayashi was charged with violating General DeWitt's Public Procla-
mation No. 3, issued on March 24, 1942, which declared in pertinent part:
[A]ll alien Japanese, all alien Germans, all alien Italians, and all persons of Japa-
nese ancestry residing or being within the geographical limits of Military Area
No. 1 ... shall be within their place of residence between the hours of 8:00 P.M.
and 6:00 A.M., which period is hereafter referred to as the hours of curfew.
Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 88.
74. Id. at 85.
follows that, in dealing with the perils of war, Congress and the
Executive are wholly precluded from taking into account those
facts and circumstances which are relevant to measures for our
national defense and for the successful prosecution of the war,
and which may in fact place citizens of one ancestry in a differ-
ent category than others.7 5
In characteristically subtle fashion,7 6 Stone basically established
the doctrine of Fifth Amendment Equal Protection by strategically
"assum[ing]" that such a guarantee was a part of the Due Process
Clause, being "irrelevant and therefore prohibited" for even the fed-
eral government to make such distinctions. In essence, Stone's opin-
ion seems to say something like this: "Yes, the doctrine exists, and
yes, it would strike down this racial discrimination - a distinction that
is much more 'odious' than the economic distinctions that we upheld
in cases like Detroit Bank - but for the fact that, in this specific case,
the military necessity of this ancestry distinction justifies the violation
of Japanese-Americans' civil rights."
Professor Karst praised Stone's language as the "critical opinion
in th[e] series" of cases which "pointed the way to the adoption by the
Court of the doctrine of fifth amendment equal protection" in Boil-
ing.7 7 One need not argue with Karst's statement on its face. Indeed,
as Warren's Boiling citation to the case indicates, Stone's Hirabayashi
opinion, coming as it did in the majority opinion of the first civil rights
case to make a Fifth Amendment Equal Protection argument before
the Court, was quite influential in the eventual adoption of the doc-
trine.78 To give Stone the exclusive credit for "point[ing] the way" to
Boiling on the foundation of his "assum[ption]" - completely ignoring
the contributions of Justice Murphy and others - is unjustified for two
reasons.
First, Stone's language in Hirabayashi is only suggestive dicta.
No matter how one spins it, Stone equivocated in "assum[ing]" that
75. Id at 100 (emphasis added).
76. Stone used a variety of techniques, such as the subtle suggestive approach men-
tioned in the text or by floating trial balloons in footnotes as in Carolene Products' Foot-
note 4, to "effectively propose new doctrine . . . 'when he [was] unable to bring his
colleagues along .... ."' See Matthew Perry, Justice Stone and Footnote 4, 6 GEo. MASON
U. Crv. RTs. L.J. 35, 63 n.99 (1996).
77. Karst, supra note 23, at 544.
78. Moreover, Chief Justice Stone's contribution to the doctrine by his opinion in De-
troit Bank, which was also cited in Boiling, as well as his famous Footnote 4's concern for
"discrete and insular minorities," should not be minimized, especially as it relates to
Stone's feelings on discrimination against racial minorities. See generally, Perry, supra note
76, at 50-61; SAMUEL J. KONEFSKY, CiiEF JusTIcE STONE AND = SUPREME COURT 252
n.68 (1946).
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the doctrine, if established, would strike the discriminatory curfew
down if the curfew was unjustified and, thus, avoid the important con-
stitutional question at issue in the case. Professor Samuel Konefsky
criticized the opinion for this reason:
It is regrettable, however, that the Court has not been more en-
lightening on the precise distinctions. Whether or not the prin-
ciple is sound, considering the vital connection in which it was
being applied in the Hirabayashi case, the Court might have
ventured to explain more fully.
The Court thus declined even to consider the one objection on
which all the briefs filed against the actions of General DeWitt
placed the greatest emphasis, namely, that the enforced evacua-
tion of persons of Japanese descent was a denial of that mini-
mum equal protection of the laws implicit in the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment.79
Moreover, the cases which Stone cited to support his "as-
sum[ption]" really did not help establish Fifth Amendment Equal Pro-
tection against the federal government. Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886)80
and Hill v. Texas (1942)81 applied to the states through express terms
of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and Yu
Cong Eng v. Trinidad (1926)82 involved a challenge based on the ex-
press terms of the Philippine Bill of Rights' Equal Protection Clause.
Thus, these citations did not address the critical question at issue in
Hirabayashi namely whether the Fifth Amendment, which has no ex-
press Equal Protection Clause, contained an implicit equal protection
guarantee, as interpreted through the Due Process Clause, against
federal racial discrimination.
Second, the history behind the all-important Fifth Amendment
"assum[ption]" in Hirabayashi further weakens the argument that the
decision deserves exclusive credit for "pointing the way" to Boiling.
A close inspection of Hirabayashi's evolution reveals that not until
Stone's second recirculation of his draft opinion did he augment the
standard Fifth Amendment discussion 3 with the critical statements
that "[w]e may assume that these considerations would be controlling
here were it not for the fact that the danger of espionage and sabo-
tage, in time of war and of threatened invasion, calls upon the military
authorities to scrutinize every relevant fact bearing on the loyalty of
79. KoNEFsKY, supra note 78, at 252, 253.
80. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
81. 316 U.S. 400 (1942).
82. 271 U.S. 500 (1926).
83. See Karst, supra note 23, at 544.
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populations in the danger areas. Because racial discriminations are in
most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited.... ."I Thus,
at least initially, Stone's draft did not contain these key statements
which would considerably strengthen the majority's general condem-
nation of all government-sanctioned racial discrimination and, more
importantly, provide support for Warren's adoption of Fifth Amend-
ment Equal Protection in Boiling.
This initial omission perhaps weakens Karst's observation be-
cause one can speculate that the other justices on the Court, including
Justices Douglas, Roberts, and Murphy, influenced the Chief's addi-
tion of this important language. Although the specific timing of the
following account is somewhat murky, it is possible to piece together a
reasonable theory of what may have occurred.
At the initial Hirabayashi conference on May 17, 1943, Justice
Douglas voted with Stone to affirm Gordon Hirabayashi's convictions.
However, once Stone circulated his first draft opinion - it appears he
did so on May 30 - Douglas sent a letter to the Chief which objected
to Stone's statement which stated that because of prejudice against
them, Japanese-Americans "have maintained here a racial solidarity
which has tended to prevent their assimilation as an integral part of
the white population and has encouraged their attachment to Japan
and Japanese institutions."85 Douglas' May 31 letter asked Stone to
eliminate "any suggestion of racial discrimination," because the
Chief's reasoning, in part "implies or is susceptible to the inference
that the Japs who are citizens cannot be trusted because we have
treated them so badly they will seize on this way to get even. 'Racial
solidarity' and lack of 'assimilation' do not show lack of loyalty as I
84. Frank Murphy Papers, Reel 127 [hereinafter FM Papers]. The FM Papers, which
are now available only on microfilm, are housed at the Bentley Historical Library at the
University of Michigan. Whenever reference is made to Stone's Hirabayashi "as-
sum[ption]," it refers to this language. The Stone draft opinion that did not include the
"assum[ption]" read:
Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very
nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine
of equality. For that reason, legislative classification or discrimination based on
race alone has often been held to be a denial of equal protection. But it by no
means follows that, in dealing with the perils of war, Congress and the Executive
are wholly precluded from taking into account those facts and circumstances
[which are] relevant to measures for our national defense and for the successful
prosecution of the war, [and] which [may in fact] place citizens of one ancestry in
a different category from others.
Id. (citations omitted).
85. IRoNs, supra note 7, at 237.
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see it. Such circumstances may... give rise to conditions which may
breed disloyalty. But that is quite a different matter.18 6
In his note, Douglas also asked Stone whether it was necessary
"to provide an opportunity at some stage (although not necessarily in
lieu of obedience to the military order) for an individual member of
the group to show that he has been improperly classified?" 7
Stone apparently did not directly respond to Douglas' letter, so
Douglas "promptly drafted a four-page concurring opinion which he
circulated on June 388 Stone did, however, try to placate the rebel-
lious Justice and earn his much-desired support by circulating another
draft on June 7 which eliminated the Court's reference to "en-
courag[ing Japanese-Americans'] attachment to Japan and Japanese
institutions."8 9 However, by then, it was too late for the Chief to pre-
vent Douglas from writing separately. Nevertheless, Stone did not use
the language Douglas had objected to in his final Hirabayashi opinion.
Thus, perhaps a good case can be made that Justice Douglas had a
fairly significant role in the drafting of Chief Justice Stone's "critical
opinion," especially by influencing the opinion's general condemna-
tion of racial discrimination.
It appears that Justice Roberts was responsible for adding to
Stone's condemnation. Roberts influenced Stone's addition of impor-
tant language that found racial discrimination, in most circumstances,
"wholly irrelevant" to government action and, "therefore," prohib-
ited. Roberts returned Stone's second recirculation 90 with this margin
comment and Stone incorporated it - dropping only the word
"wholly" - into his final opinion.91 Could it be that Roberts con-
86. ALPHEus THoMAs MASON, HARLAN FisKE STONE: PILLAR OF T=- LAW 673
(1956).
87. MASON, supra note 86, at 674.
88. IRONS, supra note 7, at 237.
89. MASON, supra note 86, at 674-75. See also Irons, supra note 7, at 240-41.
90. These margin notes appear on the second recirculation and are dated June 21,
1943. See Harlan Fiske Stone Papers at the Library of Congress, Box 68. This is the date
the final opinion was handed down, and Mr. Bennett Boskey, Chief Justice Stone's clerk
during the 1943 term explained that one should assume that this date "was later affixed to
show the date the opinion was handed down, and has nothing to do with the date on which
the second recirculation was sent around by Stone." Letter from Bennett Boskey to MJP
(May 3, 1999)(on file with author).
91. Roberts marginalia has "wholly irrelevant and therefore" pointing to follow "cir-
cumstances." See Stone Papers, Box 68. Without the benefit of a professional grapholo-
gist, one can see characteristics which strongly suggest that this is Roberts' work. Mr.
Boskey wrote: "On page 14, the words "wholly irrelevant and therefore" look to me as if
they are in Justice Roberts' handwriting, though I cannot be certain. As you know, the
words do appear in the final opinion, and hence probably resulted from Justice Roberts'
suggestion." Letter from Bennett Bosky to MJP (May 3, 1999)(on file with author).
vinced Stone to include this addition to strengthen the majority's gen-
eral condemnation of racism? It is consistent with the concerns
Justice Roberts later expressed in his Korematsu dissent which, like
Murphy's, squarely addressed the racism inherent in the exclusion or-
der.92 Additionally, it is noteworthy to mention that both Roberts and
Murphy concurred in Endo, imploring the Court to decide the basic
constitutionality of the exclusion measure, indicating the two Justices
certainly thought along the same lines in these cases. Although some-
what attenuated, this argument shows that exclusive credit for Hiraba-
yashi's condemnation of racial classifications cannot rightly be given
only to Chief Justice Stone; Justice Roberts seems to deserve at least
some of the praise.
The same could be said of Justice Murphy, who initially reserved
his vote in the May 17 Hirabayashi conference. It is not clear exactly
when, but sometime in early June - probably around June 5 - after
Stone had circulated his first majority draft and Douglas his concur-
ring draft, Murphy decided to dissent from Stone's opinion and "at
least some of his brethren had in their hands the draft of a powerful
[Murphy] opinion." 93 Like Douglas, Murphy objected to Stone's dis-
cussion of Japanese-Americans' racial and cultural characteristics. For
example, one comment on Murphy's copy of Stone's draft asks
whether "Stone's remarks about Japanese-language schools were
equally applicable to 'Catholic and other church schools. ' ' 94 Mur-
phy's powerful dissenting draft left no doubt that he believed that the
racial basis upon which the curfew restriction rested failed constitu-
tional muster. Moreover, Murphy staked this argument on the im-
plied guarantee of equal protection as interpreted through the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause:
This is the first time, so far as I am aware, that a substantial
restriction on the personal liberty of citizens based solely on the
accident of race or ancestry has been upheld by this Court. The
92. See 323 U.S. at 226 ("On the contrary, it is the case of convicting a citizen as a
punishment for not submitting to imprisonment in a concentration camp, based on his
ancestry, and solely because of his ancestry, without evidence or inquiry concerning his
loyalty and good disposition towards the United States. If this be a correct statement of
the facts disclosed by this record, and facts of which we take judicial notice, I need hardly
labor the conclusion that Constitutional rights have been violated.").
93. Fine, Mr. Justice Murphy and the Hirabayashi Case, supra note 14, at 202. Unfor-
tunately, this opinion was undated. However, judging from comments that Murphy made
to Justice Frankfurter about both Stone and Douglas' draft opinions ("Well, if the Chief's
[opinion] was addressed to the American Legion, Bill's was addressed to the mob.") before
the June 5 conference, it appears safe to speculate that Murphy had decided to dissent by
then and begun writing his draft. Id.
94. Id. at 204.
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result is to permit the creation in this country of two classes of
citizens for the purposes of the war - to sanction discrimination
between groups of United States citizens on the basis of ances-
try. This is in contravention of principles that have always been
regarded as immutable and sacred to our ways of life. Cf. Truax
v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 332. We have consistently held that at-
tempts to apply regulatory action to particular groups solely on
the basis of racial distinction or classification is not in accor-
dance with due process of law as prescribed by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Cf Wong Wing v. United States, 163
U.S. 228, 238; Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369; Yu Cong
Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 524-528; Farrington v. Tokushige,
273 U.S. 284. It is true that even the guaranty of equal protection
of the laws allows a measure of reasonable classification, but a
reasonable classification based solely upon race or creed is hardly
a reasonable one. It is also true that the Fifth Amendment, unlike
the Fourteenth, contains no guarantee of equal protection of the
laws. Cf Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 14. It by no means fol-
lows, however, that there may not be discrimination of such an
injurious character in the application of laws as to amount to a
denial of due process of law as that term is used in the Fifth
Amendment. I think that point is reached when we have one law
for the majority of our citizens and another for those of a particu-
lar racial heritage."
95. FM Papers, Reel 127 (emphasis added). The fact that Justice Murphy's draft opin-
ion included both Wong Wing (1896) and Farrington (1927) to support his Fifth Amend-
ment Equal Protection argument shows that Justice Murphy did do serious - and original -
thinking in this area, as these citations were not included in Gordon Hirabayashi's brief
nor the amicus briefs filed in the case. Moreover, it is somewhat unfortunate that Murphy
did not keep these citations and fairly ingenious legal theory for his final opinion, as they
would have lent additional support to his theory, not to mention this article's claim.
The relevant excerpt from Wong Wing reads:
And in the case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 369, it was said: 'The fourteenth
amendment to the constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens. It
says: 'Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the law.' These provisions are universal in their application to all persons
within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of
color, or nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the pro-
tection of equal laws.' Applying this reasoning to the Fifth and Sixth amend-
ments, it must be concluded that all persons within the territory of the United
States are entitled to the protection guarantied by those amendments, and that
even aliens shall not be held to answer for a capital or other infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law.
163 U.S. at 238.
The Farrington citation relies on substantive due process, a then-discredited doctrine,
which might explain why Murphy eliminated it from his final opinion:
The general doctrine touching rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
to owners, parents and children in respect of attendance upon schools has been
announced in recent opinions. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390; Bartels v. Iowa,
It is impossible to say whether the language of this dissent had
any effect on Stone's addition of the Fifth Amendment racial "as-
sum[ption]" to his draft opinion. One could speculate that Murphy
communicated with the Chief regarding the reservations he felt to-
wards the racial and cultural characteristics in Stone's first circulated
draft. This is unlikely, however, for the simple fact that Stone and
Murphy rarely communicated. Mr. John Pickering, Justice Murphy's
law clerk during that term, agreed with this conclusion,96 and Profes-
sors Fine and Howard seemed to also agree on this point.97
It is perhaps more likely that upon reading Murphy's powerful
draft, Stone added the racial "assum[ption]" to keep Justice Rutledge,
who had initially joined Douglas' June 3 opinion, from going over to
262 U.S. 404; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510. While that amendment
declares that no state shall 'deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law,' the inhibition of the Fifth Amendment, 'No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,' applies to the
federal government and agencies set up by Congress for the government of the
territory. Those fundamental rights of the individual which the cited cases de-
clared were protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from infringement by the
states, are guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment against action by the territorial
Legislature or officers.
273 U.S. at 298-99. As discussed above, Chief Justice Warren also included Farrington in
his Boiling draft, before he eliminated the opinion's reliance on substantive due process.
96. "My recollection from long ago is that [Murphy and Stone] were correct, but not
close or cordial, even though they shared some common views." E-mail from John H.
Pickering to MP (March 17, 1999) (on file with author).
97. Professor Fine first described Justice Frankfurter's efforts to deter Murphy from
dissenting in Hirabayashi, which Frankfurter successfully managed in part by urging Mur-
phy to "take the initiative with the Chief in getting him to take out everything that either
offends you or that you would want to express more ironically." However, as Professor
Fine pointed out:
Murphy does not appear to have to have followed this advice, but judging from
the futile effort of Justice William 0. Douglas to persuade Stone to omit from his
opinion "any suggestion of racial discrimination" and to indicate that the "indi-
vidual member of the group" should be given the "opportunity at some stage...
to show that he has been improperly classified," it is unlikely that Murphy, whose
objections to the Chief Justice's opinion were even stronger than those of Doug-
las, could have persuaded Stone to alter his draft in any substantial way. At one
point, Stone, as a matter of fact, had added a reservation to his opinion in order
to satisfy Douglas, but, in the end, to hold other members of the Court, he had
decided "to stand by the substance of my opinion."
Fine, Mr. Justice Murphy and the Hirabayashi Case, supra note 14, at 205.
Professor Howard echoed this same account:
Penetrating as was his criticism, however, Justice Murphy was filled with nagging
insecurities about a lone dissent in the middle of a war. There is no evidence that
he took his doubts to Stone, who was having difficulties enough holding Justice
Douglas to the racial ovations in his opinion, while at the same time satisfying
Justice Frankfurter's strong convictions that waging war was an executive and leg-
islative responsibility.
HowARD, supra note 15, at 307.
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Murphy's side.98 His recirculated opinion, Stone could now claim, ef-
fectively dealt with and disposed of Murphy's Fifth Amendment
Equal Protection argument. Lending additional credibility to this
speculation is the fact that Murphy clearly noticed Stone's addition,
highlighting Stone's entire "assum[ption]" statement in the text of the
majority opinion.99 It is almost as if Justice Murphy recognized that
his dissent had at least strengthened the majority opinion's condemna-
tion of the racialy-based curfew restriction and Murphy was resigned
to accept this limited victory, which would someday make an impor-
tant contribution to the adoption of the doctrine as Professor Karst
later correctly observed.100
B. Justice Murphy and Hirabayashi
Of course, Justice Murphy eventually concurred reluctantly in
Hirabayashi, in great part due to Justice Frankfurter's intense lobby-
ing that the Court needed to present a united front in this highly
charged case,' 0' but also as a result of the more gentle influence of
Justice Stanley Reed.' 2 Nevertheless, Murphy's concurrence "bore a
98. Justice Rutledge, who eventually wrote a short concurrence in Hirabayashi, stated
in a June 12 message to Stone that he "had more anguish over this case than any I have
decided, save possibly one death case in the Ct. of Appeals," adding that "I have strong
sympathy with Mr. Justice Murphy's views" in the case. Irons, supra note at 247, 248.
99. See FM Papers, Reel 127.
100. See Karst, supra note 23, at 544. It should be noted that Mr. Boskey was skeptical
of this theory: "As a guess, I might add, I would be a little bit surprised if anything circu-
lated by Justice Murphy had had any influence on revisions which occurred in Chief Justice
Stone's opinion." Letter from Bennett Boskey to MJP (March 30, 1999) (on file with
author).
101. See Fine, Mr. Justice Murphy and the Hirabayashi Case, supra note 14, at 205-06.
By analyzing the Frank Murphy Papers, Professor Fine convincingly argued that Murphy
concurred "only with the greatest reluctance and, to a degree, against his better judgment,"
id. at 208, due primarily to Justice Frankfurter's campaign, as revealed through many corre-
spondences between the two justices in the days leading up to the final decision. Some of
these letters reveal just how heavy-handed and to what levels Frankfurter would stoop to
get his way; the answer being very heavy and to utterly no downward limit. Professor Fine
did not reveal Frankfurter's name in his article, referring to him simply as "the Justice,"
because Frankfurter was still alive when it was published in 1964. After Frankfurter's
death, Fine identified him in Tim WASHINGTON YEARS (published in 1985), supra note 15,
at 441-44. There, Professor Fine further speculated that Murphy's decision not to dissent
could have been because of "a lack of confidence in his judgment regarding the reasona-
bleness of the curfew order, or a decision to bide his time until the far more important
question of the relocation process itself inevitably came before the Court ...." FiNE, Tim
WASHINGTON YEARS, supra note 15, at 443.
102. Professor Irons provided the most complete account of Justice Reed's influence on
Murphy's Hirabayashi concurrence:
As the day for the final decision approached, Murphy developed second thoughts
about his isolated position as the only dissenter in the Hirabayashi case. Justice
striking resemblance to the dissenting opinion he had intended to is-
sue,"'10 3 as he made only "cosmetic changes"'1 4 to his initial draft.
The Fifth Amendment Equal Protection argument in Murphy's
published Hirabayashi concurrence reads:
Today is the first time, so far as I am aware, that we have sus-
tained a substantial restriction of the personal liberty of citizens
of the United States based upon the accident of race or ancestry.
Under the curfew order here challenged no less than 70,000
American citizens have been placed under a special ban and de-
prived of their liberty because of their particular racial inheri-
tance. In this sense it bears a melancholy resemblance to the
treatment accorded to members of the Jewish race in Germany
and in other parts of Europe. The result is the creation in this
country of two classes of citizens for the purposes of a critical
and perilous hour - to sanction discrimination between groups
of United States citizens on the basis of ancestry. In my opinion
this goes to the very brink of constitutional power.
Except under conditions of great emergency a regulation of this
kind applicable solely to citizens of a particular racial extraction
would not be regarded as in accord with the requirement of due
process of law contained in the Fifth Amendment. We have con-
sistently held that attempts to apply regulatory action to particu-
lar groups solely on the basis of racial distinction or
classification is not in accordance with due process of law as pre-
scribed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Cf. Yick Wo.
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356; Yu Con Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500,
524-528. See also Boyd v. Frankfort, 117 Ky. 199, 77 S.W. 669;
Opinion of the Justices, 207 Mass. 601, 94 N.E. 558. It is true
that the Fifth Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth, contains no
guarantee of equal protection of the laws. Cf. Currin v. Wallace,
Stanley Reed applied the first gentle push. "Murphy had a considerable rapport
with Justice Reed, their chambers were next to each other, and Reed had been
making various suggestions about the Schneiderman case" on which Murphy was
writing the Court's opinion, John Pickering recalled. The first draft of Murphy's
dissent in Hirabayashi had conceded that if "substantial evidence" existed of that
Japanese Americans were "generally disloyal," or had "otherwise by their behav-
ior furnished reasonable ground" for dealing with them as a group, the curfew
order "might be defended and upheld against legal attack in the light of the con-
ditions and the military situation which then prevailed." Reed found this argu-
ment "appealing," but not totally convincing. "If you admit this you give your
case away," he wrote [in the margins of Murphy's draft]. "Military protection
only needs reasonable grounds, which this record has. You cannot wait for an
invasion to see if loyalty triumphs." Murphy bowed to this criticism. "Whether
the record provides reasonable grounds, whether the evidence shows 'general dis-
loyalty,' is a question of opinion," he informed Pickering on June 8. "I assumed it
did not." Nonetheless, he instructed Pickering to strike the offending sentences
from the draft.
IRONS, supra note 7, at 245-46.
103. Fine, Mr. Justice Murphy and the Hirabayashi Case, supra note 14, at 206-07.
104. IRONS, supra note 7, at 247.
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306 U.S. 1, 14. It is also true that even the guaranty of equal
protection of the laws allows a measure of reasonable classifica-
tion. It by no means follows, however, that there may not be
discrimination of such an injurious character in the application
of laws as to amount to a denial of due process of law as that
term is used in the Fifth Amendment. I think that point is dan-
gerously approached when we have one law for the majority of
our citizens and another for those of a particular racial
heritage.10 5
There are some obvious changes here from Murphy's drafted dis-
sent. Most importantly, he eliminated the statements that "a classifi-
cation based solely on race or creed is hardly a reasonable one" and
that the curfew restriction "reached [a denial of due process] when we
have one law for the majority of our citizens and another for those of
a particular racial heritage."'1 6 Instead, Murphy held that the point of
denying such a due process right was only "dangerously approached"
by this racially-based measure, "go[ing] to the very brink of constitu-
tional power."'1 7 He also eliminated the Truax v. Corrigan°8 refer-
ence, and changed a few citations.'0 9
However, when Justice Murphy changed his dissent to a concur-
rence, he added the lamentation that the curfew order's restriction of
Japanese-Americans' liberty bore "a melancholy resemblance to the
treatment accorded to members of the Jewish race in Germany and in
other parts of Europe, '"' ° using this dark analogy to greatly
strengthen his condemnation of the curfew."' Thus, even while he
105. 320 U.S. at 111-12. Murphy attached Footnote 2 at the end of the next-to-last
sentence.
106. FM Papers, Reel 127.
107. 320 U.S. at 111-12.
108. See FM Papers, Reel 127.
109. As discussed above, Justice Murphy substituted Boyd and In re Opinion of the
Justices for Wong Wing and Farrington. This is infortunate, as both Boyd and In re Opin-
ion were state cases covered by the Fourteenth Amendment, as was Yick Wo. Yu Con Eng
involved the express Equal Protection Clause of the Philippines Bill of Rights. Thus, these
citations do not seem to support Murphy's implied Fifth Amendment Equal Protection
argument as well as Wong Wing and Farrington, both territorial cases which seemed to
implicate a Fifth Amendment Equal Protection guarantee as interpreted through the Due
Process Clause, since the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply.
It also appears that Reed may have suggested striking the Wong Wing and Farrington
citations, as in the same draft which contained Reed's margin comments above, there is a
line drawn through the citations with "Out" written in the margin. Whether Reed was the
one who suggested eliminating these or whether it was Murphy or Pickering is indecipher-
able from the handwriting, but it seems open to speculation that the citations were elimi-
nated due to Reed's influence. See FM Papers, Reel 127.
110. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 111.
111. This sentence does not appear in any of his earlier dissenting drafts. It appears
that Murphy added it only after he had decided to concur. See FM Papers, Reel 127.
was retreating from his dissent, this sobering passage illustrated that
Murphy was not backpedaling from his personal antipathy towards
the curfew measure's racial bases.112 As Professor Fine neatly
summarized:
The published concurrence contained the same language as the
unpublished dissent with regard to the applicability of the Bill of
Rights in wartime, Murphy's abhorrence of distinctions based
on ancestry, his faith in the American melting pot and his lack of
concern about ethnic differences in American society, and the
relationship of the due process clause to discrimination based on
racial heritage." 3
Justice Murphy's Hirabayashi concurrence, like Stone's majority
opinion, demonstrates one of the first times a Supreme Court Justice
suggested that an equal protection guarantee, as interpreted through
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, might exist in a civil
rights case challenging a federal government racial distinction. But
Murphy went farther than Stone. Murphy also provided a rationale to
justify his conclusion, which was more than could be said about
Stone's added "assum[ption]" which cited to little or no authoritative
support. Murphy's argument that an instance of discrimination might
be "of such an injurious character in the application of laws as to
amount to a denial of due process 11 4 was squarely revealed in the
language of Currin and Detroit Bank."5 Moreover, in a footnote, Jus-
112. This particular line did not go unnoticed. The Frank Murphy Papers contain a
letter from a San Francisco lawyer who respectfully asked Justice Murphy whether he "in-
tentionally or [ ] inadvertently" used the term "Jewish race" in his opinion, because the
attorney was worried that Nazi propagandists would use Murphy's statement of this an-
thropological controversy as an authoritative citation:
I hope you do not regard me as captious upon this matter. Knowing of your
broad understanding and your manifest sensitivity to problems affecting minority
groups, I am sure you would not intentionally do anything that would give com-
fort to present or future bigots, or to those who glory in being intolerant.
Letter from Nat Schmulowitz to Frank Murphy (August 16, 1943) in FM Papers, Reel 127.
Justice Murphy, sensitive to this letter's concerns, promptly replied:
The statement you refer to in the first paragraph of your letter was inserted in my
opinion to assail bigotry and racialism not to give comfort to present or future
bigots.
Thank you for your letter and for bringing the point to my attention. I will ex-
plore your suggestion without delay.
Letter from Frank Murphy to Nat Schmulowitz (August 25, 1943) in FM Papers, Reel 127.
113. Fine, Mr. Justice Murphy and the Hirabayashi Case, supra note 14, at 207.
114. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 112.
115. Currin stated that "[i]f it be assumed that there might be discrimination of such an
injurious character as to bring into operation the due process clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment ... ." 306 U.S. at 14. Detroit Bank surmised that "[e]ven if discriminatory legislation
may be so arbitrary and injurious in character as to violate the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment.... ." 317 U.S. at 338.
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tice Murphy gave an example of when such injurious discrimination
might arise:
For instance, if persons of an accused's race were systematically
excluded from a jury in a federal court, any conviction undoubt-
edly would be considered a violation of the requirement of due
process of law, even though the ground commonly stated for set-
ting aside convictions to obtained in state courts is denial of
equal protection of the laws. Cf. Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60, with Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128.116
This was an interesting argument. Murphy seemed to argue that
the Court essentially had already adopted a Fifth Amendment-like
Equal Protection guarantee and applied it in Glasser, a 1942 Murphy-
authored majority opinion which dealt with, among other issues, the
composition of federal juries. In Glasser, the petit jury panel had
been selected primarily from lists supplied by the League of Women
Voters which contained only names of the group's members. The
Court accepted the argument that "[t]he deliberate exclusion of jurors
from the membership of particular private organizations definitely
does not conform to the traditional requirements of a jury trial," even
though the Court held that Glasser had not proven this had happened
in his trial." 7 Murphy's Hirabayashi opinion compared Glasser, a fed-
eral jury case, to Smith, a unanimous opinion written by Justice Black
116. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 112 n.2.
117. 315 U.S. at 86, 87. The relevant Glasser language reads:
Our notions of what a proper jury is have developed in harmony with our basic
concepts of a democratic society and a representative government. For 'It is part
of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that
the jury be a body truly representative of the community.' Smith v. Texas, 311
U.S. 128, 130, 61 S.Ct. 164, 165, 85 L.Ed. 84.
Jurors in a federal court are to have the qualifications of those in the highest court
of the State, and they are to be selected by the clerk of the court and a jury
commissioner. Secs. 275, 276, Jud.Code, 28 U.S.C. sees. 411, 412, 28 U.S.C.A. ss
411, 412. This duty of selection may not be delegated. United States v. Murphy,
D.C., 224 F. 554; In re Petition for Special Grand Jury, D.C., 50 F.2d 973. And, its
exercise must always accord with the fact that the proper functioning of the jury
system, and, indeed, our democracy itself, requires that the jury be a body truly
representative of the community', and not the organ of any special group or class.
If that requirement is observed, the officials charged with choosing federal jurors
may exercise some discretion to the end that competent jurors may be called. But
they must not allow the desire for competent jurors to lead them into selections
which do not comport with the concept of the jury as a cross-section of the com-
munity. Tendencies, no matter how slight, toward the selection of jurors by any
method other than a process which will insure a trial by a representative group
are undermining processes weakening the institution of jury trial, and should be
sturdily resisted. That the motives influencing such tendencies may be of the best
must not blind us to the dangers of allowing any encroachment whatsoever on
this essential right. Steps innocently taken may one by one lead to the irretriev-
able impairment of substantial liberties.
315 U.S. at 85-86.
that held that a state's conviction based on an indictment returned by
a jury which "intentionally and systematically excluded [African-
Americans] from grand jury service solely on account of their race and
color" violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause.'1 ' In doing so, Murphy seemed to suggest that it was only a
small leap to infer that a similar conviction by a federal jury so ille-
gally constituted would also violate equal protection of the law as in-
terpreted through the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause,
because that protection guaranteed the same civil rights as the Four-
teenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Moreover, Murphy
appeared to rely on Smith's statement that "racial discrimination [re-
sulting] in the exclusion from jury service of otherwise qualified
groups not only violates our Constitution and the laws enacted under
it but is at war with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a
representative government." 119 Certainly, Murphy believed, the ex-
clusion of jurors on the basis of race - whether in a federal or state
trial - also violated these "basic concepts of a democratic society"' 2
whether or not a specific, express equal protection guarantee applied
to the government action at issue. Whatever the merit of this argu-
ment, it is interesting that Justice Murphy attempted to justify his sug-
gestion that a Fifth Amendment Equal Protection doctrine existed
and might apply to a federal racial discrimination by citing his own
Glasser opinion. It certainly seems to support the thesis here that his
role in the road to Boiling was more substantial than has been previ-
ously recognized.
Murphy's Hirabayashi concurrence followed his Fifth Amend-
ment Equal Protection discussion by begrudgingly concluding that the
injurious racial discrimination based on Japanese ancestry was justi-
fied by the "critical military situation which prevailed on the Pacific
Coast area in the spring of 1942. ''121 Murphy was quick to point out
that this would not be the case in "normal times" and that even during
this crisis period, the Court had the "inescapable duty of seeing that
the mandates of the Constitution are obeyed," 22 a clear warning that
he was not likely to defer to military actions that treaded upon on
constitutional rights beyond the curfew restrictions at issue. Although
Hirabayshi was an extremely close case for Justice Murphy, the war-
time distinction only "[went] to the very brink of constitutional
118. 311 U.S. at 129.
119. Id. at 130.
120. 311 U.S. at 130.
121. 320 U.S. at 112.
122. 1&d at 113.
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power,"'" rather than reaching it, as he had previously wanted to
conclude.
Despite the regrettable fact that Justice Murphy concurred in
Hirabayashi, there can be no doubt that his opinion provided power-
ful and perhaps persuasive advocacy of the Fifth Amendment Equal
Protection doctrine. Although Chief Justice Warren's Boiling opinion
failed to cite to Murphy's opinion, Warren's language was fairly simi-
lar: Boiling stated that "discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to
be violative of due process,""124 while Murphy's Hirabayashi concur-
rence opined that discrimination may be "of such an injurious charac-
ter in the application of laws as to amount to a denial of due
process .... "'2 Boiling also held that "[c]lassifications based solely on
race must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary
to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect."' 26 This language
is strikingly similar to Justice Murphy's Hirabayashi observation that
"[d]istinctions based on color and ancestry are utterly inconsistent
with our traditions and ideals."' 27
If nothing else, this discussion at least disproves Professor Karst's
statement that Chief Justice Stone's Hirabayashi opinion should be
given all the credit for "point[ing] the way to the adoption by the
Court of the doctrine of fifth amendment equal protection."'" Justice
Murphy's contributions to Bolling's evolution deserve some recogni-
tion, too.
C. Justice Black and Korematsu
In Korematsu, Justice Black's opinion for the Court upheld the
exclusion program of "all persons of Japanese ancestry" from certain
parts of the West Coast.'2 9 In Boiling, Chief Justice Warren cited,
123. Id. at 111.
124. 347 U.S. at 499.
125. 320 U.S. at 112. Again, Professor Kerr's observation of the similarities here and
Warren's failure to cite Murphy's opinions should be noted here. See Kerr, supra note 70,
at 16-17.
126. 347 U.S. at 499.
127. 320 U.S. at 110.
128. Karst, supra note 23, at 544.
129. Fred Korematsu was charged with violating General DeWitt's Civilian Exclusion
Order No. 34, issued on May 3, 1942, which declared in pertinent part: "[I]t is hereby
ordered.., all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien, be excluded from
that portion of Military Area No. 1...." Korematsu v. United States, 140 F.2d 289, 294
(9th Cir. 1943). Korematsu dealt only with the exclusion order; the Court expressly de-
clined to reach the constitutionality of the entire detention and relocation program itself:
Since the petitioner has not been convicted of failing to report or to remain in an
assembly or relocation center, we cannot in this case determine the validity of
along with Stone's Hirabayashi opinion, to Justice Black's statement
in Korematsu that
[i]t should noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which
curtail the civil fights of a single racial group are immediately
suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconsti-
tutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most
rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify
the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never
can.
13 0
Warren cited this passage to support his statement that
"[c]lassifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with par-
ticular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence consti-
tutionally suspect.' 131 It should be emphasized, however, that there is
an interesting history behind Black's Korematsu admonition. Accord-
ing to Professor Peter Irons, Justice Black had earlier included this
paragraph in a draft, but crossed it out before circulating his first opin-
ion to the Court.13 2 Black eliminated this "[p]erhaps in response to
Murphy's dissent," which questioned whether "there was a 'factual
foundation of record' in the Korematsu case to support the mass evac-
uation of Japanese Americans."' 33 Further, Black might have feared
that the statement would be an embarrassing reference to the strict
scrutiny standard of United States v. Carolene Products' Footnote 4,134
which neither Hirabayashi nor Korematsu applied.135 However, be-
cause Black was now "under fire from the dissenters," including Mur-
phy, for the Court's insensitivity to the racial discrimination at issue in
the case, "Black retrieved his earlier draft and revised the paragraph
for the final opinion," putting the race admonition back in his opin-
ion.' 6 Thus, Professor Irons' account suggests that Justice Murphy
possibly played a significant role in the presence of Black's strong
Korematsu language. This indirectly supports the argument that Mur-
those separate provisions of the order. It is sufficient here for us to pass upon the
order which petitioner violated. To do more would be to go beyond the issues
raised, and to decide momentous questions not contained within the framework
of the pleadings or the evidence in this case. It will be time enough to decide the
serious constitutional issues which petitioner seeks to raise when an assembly or
relocation order is applied or is certain to be applied to him, and we have its
terms before us.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 222 (1944).
130. Id. at 216.
131. Boiling, 347 U.S. at 499.
132. See IRONS, supra note 7, at 339.
133. Id.
134. 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (1938).
135. See IRONS, supra note 7, at 339.
136. Id. at 339.
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phy should be recognized for his contribution to Boiling. In Boiling,
Warren cited Black's condemnation of racial discrimination as support
for his adoption of Fifth Amendment Equal Protection analysis.
There is little else in Black's Korematsu opinion that mentions
Fifth Amendment Equal Protection; Black simply ignored the Fifth
Amendment Equal Protection arguments Fred Korematsu made in his
briefs.'37 There is no express discussion of the doctrine anywhere, al-
though one might argue that it was implied from Black's "immediately
suspect" admonition of racial classifications. This idea, however, is
weakened by Black's special efforts to preempt any equal protection
debate. Black would not concede that Fred Korematsu was "excluded
137. It should be noted that the Frank Murphy Papers contain drafts of Justice Robert
Jackson's Korematsu dissent which reveal that Jackson considered making a subtle-but-
powerful Fifth Amendment Equal Protection argument, only to tone down his rhetoric and
omit any mention of the doctrine in his published opinion. In his draft, Jackson argued
that "guilt is personal and not inheritable," but that the exclusion order was
[A]n attempt to make an otherwise innocent act a crime merely because this pris-
oner is the son of parents as to whom he had no choice, and belongs to a race
from which there is no way to resign. If people of any foreign country should
make one a criminal because of prenatal events, the American people would think
them very backward and no doubt would dispatch missionaries for their enlighten-
ment. If Congress in peace-time legislation should classify citizens according to
ancestry for frankly unequal treatment in criminal law, I should suppose this Court
would refuse to enforce it.
FM Papers, Reel 129 (emphasis added). In his published opinion, Jackson omitted the
"missionary enlightenment" statement entirely and tempered his "frankly unequal treat-
ment" statement by instead substituting "such a criminal law," a much less severe condem-
nation of the exclusion order than in his draft. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 243-44. Moreover,
Jackson also omitted entirely a footnote that he had originally attached to this discussion
which, among several other citations, quoted at length Chief Justice Taft's Truax v. Corri-
gan dicta and might well have contributed to the adoption of the Fifth Amendment Equal
Protection doctrine had he published it. The omitted footnote read:
See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 536; Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60; Terrace
v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197; Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500; State v.
Darnell, 166 N.C. 300; Carey v. Atlanta, 143 Ga. 192. But cf. Harden v. Atlanta,
147 Ga. 248; Harris v. Louisville, 165 Ky. 559; Hopkins v. Richmond, 117 Va. 692.
There is of course no equal protection clause applicable to the Federal Govern-
ment. But Chief Justice Taft, referring to the Fifth Amendment, said: "It, of
course, tends to secure equality of law in the sense that it makes a required mini-
mum of protection for every one's right of life, liberty, and property, which the
Congress or the Legislature may not withhold. Our whole system of law is predi-
cated on the general fundamental principle of equality of application of the law.
'All men are equal before the law,' 'This is a government of laws and not of men,'
'No man is above the law,' - are all maxims showing the spirit in which legisla-
tures, executives and courts are expected to make, execute and apply laws."
Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332.
FM Papers, Reel 129. For some reason, Jackson decided not to include this footnote in his
final opinion. If he had kept it, in addition to the stronger language he originally used to
describe the "frankly unequal treatment" resulting from the exclusion order, perhaps he
would also deserve some of the credit for "point[ing] the way" to Boiling. See Karst, supra
note 23, at 544.
from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race.'
138
Korematsu, as all other Japanese-Americans, was excluded only be-
cause the United States was at war with the Japanese Empire. The
exclusion order was, therefore, designed to deal with nothing more
than the domestic threat to national security.'39
Ten years later, however, Black joined the Boiling decision, evi-
dence that Black was not absolutely opposed to the idea of Fifth
Amendment Equal Protection. Despite the fact that the doctrine
seemed at odds with Black's overall theory of judicial interpretation,
the Justice offered some philosophical justification for his Bolling sup-
port. One of Black's biographers noted:
Black's support of Bolling seemingly violated his own principles:
the Fifth Amendment does not contain, nor can it be read to
incorporate, the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection
clause. When a clerk later asked how Black could justify this, he
replied: "A wise judge chooses, among plausible constitutional
philosophies, one that will generally allow him to reach results
he can believe in - a judge who does not to some extent tailor
his judicial philosophy to his beliefs inevitably becomes badly
frustrated and angry .... A judge who does not decide some
cases, from time to time, differently from the way he would
wish, because the philosophy he has adopted requires it, is not a
judge. But a judge who refuses ever to stray from his judicial
philosophy, and be subject to criticism for doing so, no matter
how important the issue involved, is a fool."' 4 °
Thus, Black was not opposed to the doctrine itself. It appears
that Black only wished to establish the doctrine when the proper case
came before the Court. Korematsu and Hirabayashi were war-time
138. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223.
139. See id.
140. See NEWMAN, supra note 53, at 435 (discussing then-Professor Guido Calabresi's -
the law clerk who asked the question - article Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Constitu-
tional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HAv. L. Rv. 80, 132
(1991)). Between Hirabayashi and Bolling, only one other case besides the ones discussed
in this article mentioned Fifth Amendment Equal Protection. In United States v. Petrillo,
332 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1947), Justice Black's majority opinion rejected the appellants' invitation
for the Court to adopt and apply the doctrine:
It is contended that the statute denies equal protection of the laws to radio-broad-
casting employees as a class, and, for this reason, violates the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment.... But it is not within our province to say that because
Congress has prohibited some practices within its power to prohibit, it must pro-
hibit all within its power... Whatever may be the limits of the power of Congress
that do not apply equally to all classes, groups, and persons, see Steward Machine
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 584, we are satisfied that Congress has not trans-
gressed those limits in the provisions of this statute which are here attacked.
Again, this case was an economic case, challenging the Communications Act of 1934, 47
U.S.C.A. § 506.
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military necessity cases which, to Black, justified substantial judicial
deference to military and political judgments. 141 Bolling, by contrast,
was a peace-time racial discrimination case and the issue of school
desegregation was never one where Black counseled deferential re-
straint from the federal bench. 4 2 Thus, perhaps by 1954, Black
thought that the doctrine of Fifth Amendment Equal Protection had
ripened and Bolling was a case which would serve as the appropriate
vehicle for the doctrine's adoption. 43
141. In Korematsu, Black wrote:
Compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens from their homes, except under
circumstances of direst emergency and peril, is inconsistent with our basic govern-
mental institutions. But when under conditions of modem warfare our shores are
threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be commensurate with the
threatened danger.
323 U.S. at 219. Additionally, as a Conference Memorandum from Chief Justice Stone to
the Court reveals, Justice Black was directly responsible for the inclusion of a similarly
deferential statement in Stone's Hirabayashi opinion:
Where, as they did here, the conditions call for the exercise of judgment and
discretion and for the choice of means by those branches of the Government on
which the Constitution has placed the responsibility of war-making, it is not for
any court to sit in review of the wisdom of their action or substitute its judgment
for theirs.
320 U.S. at 93. For the Conference Memorandum, see the Hugo Black Papers at the Li-
brary of Congress, ,Box 270. Judge Joseph A Greenaway, Jr. also has shed some light on
the reasons behind Justice Black's positions in the war-time cases:
Black's decision making in Korematsu was undoubtedly influenced by several fac-
tors outside the record. Black had served in the military and both of his sons were
serving in World War II. Black served as President Roosevelt's emissary in win-
the-war rallies and in 1942 went to Birmingham, Alabama-at Roosevelt's direc-
tion-to investigate production slow-downs that affected the war effort. Most im-
portant, General DeWitt was a family friend of Black's. Black's faith in DeWitt
added to his belief that it should be the commander in the field that makes such
decisions. More important, this relationship allowed Black, wrongly in my view,
to rely on DeWitt's representations rather than critically analyze them.
Joseph A. Greenaway, Jr., The Weintraub Lecture: Judicial Decision Making and the Exter-
nal Environment, 51 RUTGERS L. REv. 181, 189 (1998).
142. Black's insistence that the Court order Southern schools to cease their dilatory
resistance to Brown's desegregation order, indicative of the Justice's refusal to require def-
erence in matters of school desegregation. Black initially drafted a dissent in Alexander v.
Holmes County, 396 U.S. 19 (1969), in which he thundered that it was the duty of courts
"to extirpate all racial discrimination from our system of public schools NOW." See NEw-
mAN, supra note 53, at 601-02. See also 396 U.S. 1218 (1969) (opinion of Black, J.).
143. Chief Justice Rehnquist seems to imply a similar relationship to some degree:
A decade later, the Court decided the watershed case of Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation, holding that the Kansas legislature had violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by requiring public schools to segregate
students by race. But with Brown there was argued a companion case, Bolling v.
Sharpe, challenging a similarly imposed requirement of segregation in public
schools in the District of Columbia. This requirement, however, had not been
imposed by a state government but by Congress. It was therefore subject to the
Fifth Amendment, but not to the Fourteenth. The Court in Bolling, in a brief
D. Justice Murphy and Korematsu
In Korematsu, Justice Murphy "was able to make partial amends
for his troubled concurrence in Hirabayashi and to eventually present
the same conclusions embodied in his unpublished Hirabayashi dis-
sent." 1'" Murphy worked with a vengeance to declare that the exclu-
sion policy "goes over 'the brink of constitutional power' and falls into
the ugly abyss of racism.' 145 Murphy atoned for his Hirabayshi con-
currence with the Fifth Amendment Equal Protection doctrine, which
he had recognized but failed to apply in Hirabayashi:
The judicial test of whether the Government, on a plea of mili-
tary necessity, can validly deprive an individual of any of his
constitutional rights is whether the deprivation is reasonably re-
lated to a public danger that is so 'immediate, imminent, and
impending' as not to admit of delay and not to permit the inter-
vention of ordinary constitutional processes to alleviate the dan-
ger. Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34, banishing from a
prescribed area of the Pacific Coast 'all persons of Japanese an-
cestry, both alien and non-alien,' clearly does not meet that test.
Being an obvious racial discrimination, the order deprives all
those within its scope of the equal protection of the laws as guar-
anteed by the Fifth Amendment. It further deprives these indi-
viduals of their constitutional rights to live and work where they
will, to establish a home where they choose and to move about
freely. In excommunicating them without benefit of hearings,
this order also deprives them of all their constitutional rights to
procedural due process. Yet no reasonable relation to an 'imme-
diate, imminent, and impending' public danger is evident to sup-
port this racial restriction which is one of the most sweeping and
complete deprivations of constitutional rights in the history of
this nation in the absence of martial law.
One might say that Justice Murphy was guilty of constitutional
overkill in finding not one, but three independent constitutional doc-
opinion not noted for notable clarity of reasoning, held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment imposes on the federal government a limitation
similar to that imposed on the states by the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Had this doctrine been the law ten years earlier, the Su-
preme Court might have found it easier to reach a different result in Hirabayashi
and Korematsu.
Rehnquist, supra note 7, at 208.
144. Fine, Mr. Justice Murphy and the Hirabayashi Case, supra note 14, at 209.
145. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 233.
146. Id. at 234-35 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). It should be noted also that in
early drafts of his dissent, Justice Murphy did not specifically mention a violation of the
Fifth Amendment in the emphasized portion above, but rather just a generalized violation
of the equal protection of the laws. See FM Papers, Reel 129. This suggests that perhaps
he did think somewhat specifically about the notion of Fifth Amendment Equal Protection,
as at some point he inserted this particular guarantee into his opinion.
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trines - Fifth Amendment Equal Protection, substantive due process,
and procedural due process - upon which to strike down the exclusion
order. Murphy certainly left no doubt that he rendered the exclusion
order unconstitutional, once again refusing to turn a blind eye to mili.-
tary judgments of necessity.
Whichever argument one accepts, the Korematsu language is of
critical importance. Murphy's use of the conjunctions "further" and
"also" to describe how his second and third doctrines voided the ex-
clusion order strongly suggests that he believed Fifth Amendment
Equal Protection was separate from the substantive and procedural
guarantees of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, despite the
fact that all three doctrines were rooted in that same clause. As he
demonstrated in Hirabayashi, the Fifth Amendment Equal Protection
doctrine was not dependent on substantive or procedural due process;
the doctrine stood on its own.'47 Thus, Murphy advocated that Fifth
Amendment Equal Protection could be used unilaterally to strike
down unconstitutional racial discrimination by the federal
government.
Unlike Hirabayashi's more detailed and thorough discussion of
the law behind Fifth Amendment Equal Protection, however, Mur-
phy's Korematsu opinion quickly identified the doctrine as the opin-
ion's constitutional "hook" and then moved on to the more detailed
analysis of the facts of the case. The facts convincingly demonstrated
why the exclusion program was not reasonably related to the claimed
military dangers sufficient to justify "one of the most sweeping and
complete deprivations of constitutional rights in the history of this na-
tion."14 Murphy's thundering conclusion reemphasized his firm be-
lief that Japanese-Americans had not received their deserved equal
protection under the law:
I dissent, therefore, from this legalization of racism. Racial dis-
crimination in any form and in any degree has no justifiable part
whatever in our democratic way of life. It is unattractive in any
setting but it is utterly revolting among a free people who have
embraced the principles set forth in the Constitution of the
147. Moreover, in an early draft, Justice Murphy had concluded this paragraph by stat-
ing that "[t]here is, in short, no military necessity for this flagrant violation of the basic
American precept that all men have equal rights, regardless of race, color, or religion."
FM Papers, Reel 129. Unfortunately, Murphy eliminated this sentence in his final opinion.
Nevertheless, its obvious equal protection overtones strengthen the claim that Justice Mur-
phy was primarily concerned with the military's violation of Fifth Amendment Equal Pro-
tection in Korematsu, and that that doctrine could be used to strike down the exclusion
order.
148. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 235.
United States. All residents of this nation are kin in some way
by blood or culture to a foreign land. Yet they are primarily and
necessarily a part of the new and distinct civilization of the
United States. They must accordingly be treated at all times as the
heirs of the American experiment and as entitled to all the rights
and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution.'49
This final exhortation, particularly its demand that "all the rights
and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution" must be recognized "at
all times" to "all residents of this nation," was unmistakably cast in
terms of the equal protection of law for all citizens and from all gov-
ernments.' 50 As his result indicates, this guarantee included protec-
tion from the federal government, despite the absence of a specific
provision of the Bill of Rights expressly imposing such a duty on that
entity.
Thus, Murphy's Korematsu opinion illustrated that he believed
the Fifth Amendment Equal Protection doctrine was sufficiently es-
tablished to actually strike down racial discrimination by the federal
government. In so doing, Murphy became the first Supreme Court
Justice to conclude that the Fifth Amendment contained such a
power. Justice Murphy's Korematsu opinion was the first to accept
and then apply - albeit in dissent - that guarantee in a civil rights case.
Until Chief Justice Warren ratified this doctrine for the unanimous
Bolling Court, no other justice would make this same argument.
E. Justice Murphy and Endo
In Ex parte Endo,~5' decided on the same day as Korematsu, the
Court held that the War Relocation Authority lacked authority to de-
tain and relocate a Japanese-American citizen who had proven her
loyalty to the United States. By some legal craftsmanship, Justice
Douglas' majority opinion ordered the release of Mitsuye Endo, while
strategically managing to "avoid constitutional issues which are neces-
sarily involved."'5 2 Just as Justice Black had done in Korematsu,
Douglas skirted the issue of deciding whether the relocation program
violated the due process and equal protection rights of Japanese-
Americans. 53
149. Id at 242 (emphasis added).
150. Id.
151. 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
152. ld. at 308 (Roberts, J., concurring).
153. See id. at 297 ("We are of the view that Mitsuye Endo should be given her liberty.
In reaching that conclusion we do not come to the underlying constitutional issues which
have been argued. For we conclude that, whatever power the War Relocation Authority
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Not surprisingly, this opinion did not go far enough for Justice
Murphy. As one would expect, he concurred with Mitsuye Endo's re-
lease. However, Murphy went one step further and squarely ad-
dressed the critical question which the Court was avoiding. Murphy
succinctly reemphasized his firm belief that both the exclusion order
and relocation measure were unconstitutional because they violated
the Fifth Amendment Equal Protection guarantee that Murphy previ-
ously argued should have decided Korematsu:
I join in the opinion of the Court, but I am of the view that
detention in Relocation Centers of persons of Japanese ancestry
regardless of loyalty is not only unauthorized by Congress or the
Executive but is another example of the unconstitutional resort to
racism inherent in the entire evacuation program. As stated more
fully in my dissenting opinion in Fred Toyosaburo Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 65 S.Ct. 193, racial discrimination of
this nature bears no reasonable relation to military necessity and
is utterly foreign to the ideals and traditions of the American
people.' 54
There can be no doubt that Justice Murphy's attack on the reloca-
tion program's "unconstitutional resort to racism" refers primarily to
his rationale in Korematsu for striking down the exclusion order: that
the order violates the Fifth Amendment's Equal Protection guarantee
as interpreted through the Due Process Clause. This brief opinion
further established Justice Murphy's position on the Fifth Amendment
Equal Protection doctrine and strengthens the argument that he
should be given some credit for its application to federal incursions on
civil rights. 155
F. Chief Justice Stone and Steele
In Steele,' 56 decided the same day as Korematsu, the Court struck
down, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the Brotherhood of Lo-
comotive Firemen and Enginemen's racially discriminatory union rep-
resentation under the Railway Labor Act (RLA). 57 Adhering to the
Court's canon of deciding a case through available statutory interpre-
may have to detain other classes of citizens, it has no authority to subject citizens who are
concededly loyal to its leave procedure.").
154. Id. at 307-08 (emphasis added).
155. Murphy also argued that the Court had failed to address the violation of Mitsuye
Endo's right to "pass freely from state to state" because she was excluded by the order
from returning to her home in California. Id. at 308.
156. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
157. 45 U.S.C. § 151. Bester William Steele and other African-American locomotive
firemen sued the Brotherhood and twenty-one railroads regarding the racially discrimina-
tory collective bargaining agreement reached between union and employers in February
tation, rather than reaching constitutional issues unnecessarily,158
Chief Justice Stone's majority opinion was characteristically subtle
both in its manner of decision and in its condemnation of the Brother-
hood's racism under the Act:
Without attempting to mark the allowable limits of differences
in the terms of contracts based on differences of conditions to
which they apply, it is enough for present purposes to say that
the statutory power to represent a craft and to make contracts as
to wages, hours and working conditions does not include the au-
thority to make among members of the craft discriminations not
based on such relevant differences. Here the discriminations
based on race alone are obviously irrelevant and invidious. Con-
gress plainly did not undertake to authorize the bargaining repre-
sentative to make such discriminations. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356; Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500; State of
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337; Hill v. Texas,
316 U.S. 400.159
Two facts are noteworthy here, as they bear a striking resem-
blance to the background of Hirabayashi. First, the cases Stone cited
supporting his subtle condemnation of this federally-sanctioned racial
discrimination are all cases which challenged state action under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause,160 not the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. These citations do not address
Steele's critical question: whether the Fifth Amendment, which has no
express Equal Protection Clause, nevertheless contained an implicit
equal protection guarantee as interpreted through the Due Process
Clause against federal racial discrimination. Thus, Stone's opinion ad-
ded nothing substantively to support the Fifth Amendment Equal
Protection doctrine except a fairly case-specific but nevertheless ge-
neric statement that here the racial discrimination was "obviously ir-
relevant and invidious."'' Like Stone's and Black's generalized
admonitions against racial discrimination in Hirabayashi and Kore-
matsu, respectively, Steele represented another missed opportunity to
1941 which severely restricted the employment and promotion of African-American fire-
men. See Steele, 323 U.S. at 194-96.
158. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1935) (Bran-
deis, J., concurring) ("The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although
properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which
the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case
can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other
a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter.").
159. Steele, 323 U.S. at 203 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
160. Again, an exception must be recognized for Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, which in-
volved the Philippine Bill of Rights, which actually contained an Equal Protection Clause.
161. Steele, 323 U.S. at 203.
VWinter 2000] A CONTRIBUTION UNRECOGNIZED
282 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 27:243
seriously advance the adoption of a Fifth Amendment Equal Protec-
tion guarantee.
Second, Stone's first draft and recirculation of Steele did not con-
tain the statements that "discriminations based on race alone are obvi-
ously irrelevant and invidious. Congress plainly did not undertake to
authorize the bargaining representative to make such discrimina-
tions."' 62 Just as was the case with Stone's addition of his Fifth
Amendment "assum[ption]" in Hirabayashi, this race-sensitive lan-
guage was added during the opinion's evolution. Again, like in Hira-
bayashi, one must wonder: where did this language come from? Did
anyone influence the Chief Justice's incorporation of the doctrine into
his opinion? Perhaps Justice Murphy, who was circulating his power-
ful moral condemnation of the racism at work in Steele, discussed be-
low in greater detail, somehow communicated to Stone that the
doctrine should be incorporated. Professor Gressman and Judge
Nickerson, Murphy's and Stone's respective law clerks during the
1944 term, however, were both skeptical of this possibility, as there
was little communication between Murphy and Stone. 63 Neverthe-
less, it is quite possible that Stone added this condemnation in re-
sponse to the scathing attack that Murphy was then circulating on the
racial discrimination at issue in Steele. Perhaps in an effort to protect
his solid 8-man majority from defections to Murphy's position - Jus-
tice Rutledge seemed the most likely to abandon the majority" -
Stone supplemented his opinion with this stronger language. Indeed,
Professor Gressman's comment that "whether Stone changed any-
thing in light of Murphy's circulation, I would not know,'1 65 certainly
leaves this possibility open to speculation.
162. FM Papers, Reel 129.
163. Professor Gressman recalled: "As to Stone's draft, I doubt that he eliminated or
added anything because of what Murphy may have done. Stone didn't like Murphy. But
whether Stone changed anything in light of Murphy's circulation, I would not know. There
was very little 'communication' between [Stone and Murphy]." Letter from Eugene Gress-
man to MIP (December 31, 1998) (on file with author). Judge Nickerson echoed these
thoughts: "[I have] no recollection of Justice Murphy communicating with Chief Justice
Stone on any of the cases you mention (including Steele). I do have a vivid recollection of
working on Steele v. Louisville but have no knowledge as to Justice Murphy talking with or
writing to the Chief Justice concerning the opinions in that case." Letter from Eugene H.
Nickerson to MJP (January 27, 1999) (on file with author).
164. Rutledge was Murphy's closest friend and ideological ally on the Court, and they
only rarely did not vote together. Rutledge once wrote: "Never did I disagree, when
[Murphy] was on the other side without stopping to think over my position more carefully
- indeed without agony." FmNE, THE WASHINGTON YEARS, supra note 15, at 248.
165. Letter from Eugene Gressman to MJP (December 31, 1998) (on file with author).
G. Justice Murphy and Steele
Whether or not one can actually credit Murphy for influencing
Stone's opinion, there is no doubt that Murphy's Steele concurrence
pushed for the adoption of a Fifth Amendment Equal Protection
guarantee. Murphy disliked the majority's reliance on "legal niceties,
while remaining mute and placid as to the obvious and oppressive
deprivation of constitutional guarantees" to invalidate the Brother-
hood's racist conduct.166 Instead of merely interpreting the RLA,
Murphy urged that the Court "squarely face[ ]" the "grave constitu-
tional issue" presented by this federally-sanctioned discrimination,
which "demand[ed] the invocation of constitutional condemna-
tion."167 In other words, Justice Murphy thought the racist conduct
challenged in Steele was so repugnant that the Court should strike it
down on constitutional grounds. Stone's elaborate statutory interpre-
tive method just did not satisfy Murphy.168 For Murphy, racism was
such a virulent problem that whenever it occurred, the Court should
depart from its interpretive canon and "expose and condemn it" with
the full force of the Constitution. 69
166. Steele, 323 U.S. at 208 (Murphy, J., concurring).
167. Id.
168. Indicative of their different approaches, Stone's opinion is over 15 pages, with a
multitude of citations and a less-than-explicit holding, not to mention the subtle racial con-
demnation discussed above. By contrast, Murphy's concurrence is less than two pages,
contains no citations, and reads more like a stump speech denouncing the Brotherhood
than it does a sterile, objective judicial opinion.
169. Steele, 323 U.S. at 209. Murphy also took this position when other rights he con-
sidered important were at issue, such as freedom of speech. See, e.g., Rescue Army v.
Municipal Court of City of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, 585 (1947). In Rescue Army, Mur-
phy dissented from Justice Rutledge's majority opinion, a rare occasion in itself, because
he wanted the Court to rule on the First Amendment constitutionality of the city's ordi-
nance, which regulated solicitations for charitable contributions. The Court chose rather to
follow its Ashwander principle - which Rutledge cited - and refused to rule on the consti-
tutional issues because they were not properly presented. Murphy wrote:
It is difficult for me to believe that the opinion of the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia is so ambiguous that the precise constitutional issues in this case have become
too blurred for our powers of discernment.
[T]he constitutional issues thereby raised seem clear to me. Simply stated, they
are: (1) Does it violate the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion to pro-
hibit solicitors of religious charities from using boxes or receptacles in public
places except by written permission of city officials? (2) Is that guarantee in-
fringed by a requirement that such solicitors display an information card issued by
city officials?
Those issues were properly raised below and the courts necessarily passed upon
them. The time is thus ripe for this Court to supply the definitive judicial answers.
Its failure to do so in this case forces me to register this dissent.
Rescue Army, 331 U.S. at 585. Also, in a very similar fashion to his belief that Chief Justice
Stone's Steele opinion focused too much on "legal niceties," see Steele, 323 U.S. at 208,
Murphy lamented the majority's treatment of the important First Amendment issues in
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If the Court were to constitutionally analyze the Brotherhood's
actions under the RLA, Murphy had little doubt that the Fifth
Amendment's Equal Protection guarantee would strike down the
Brotherhood's racist conduct:
The constitutional problem inherent in this instance is clear.
Congress, through the Railway Labor Act, has conferred upon
the union selected by a majority of a craft or class of railway
workers the power to represent the entire craft or class in all
collective bargaining matters. While such a union is essentially a
private organization, its power to represent and bind all mem-
bers of a class or craft is derived solely from Congress. The Act
contains no language which directs the manner in which the bar-
gaining representative shall perform its duties. But it cannot be
assumed that Congress meant to authorize the representative to
act so as to ignore rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Other-
wise the Act would bear the stigma of unconstitutionality under
the Fifth Amendment in this respect. For that reason I am willing
to read the statute as not permitting or allowing any action by
the bargaining representative in the exercise of its delegated
powers which would in effect violate the constitutional rights of
individuals. 7
Rescue Army. In a draft opinion, he warned that "[t]he danger that some of our religious
freedom may be lost by the enforcement of seemingly innocent regulations is too great to
be ignored, especially under the guise of applying hypertechnicalities." See FM Papers,
Reel 129. Unfortunately and inexplicably, Murphy replaced this statement with the last
line quoted above. See also Murphy's concurrence in Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 160
(1945)("When the immutable freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights have been so
openly and concededly ignored [by a federal statute], the full wrath of constitutional con-
demnation descends upon the action taken by the Government. And only by expressing
that wrath can we give form and substance to 'the great, the indispensable democratic
freedoms' to which this nation is dedicated.") (citation omitted).
170. Steele, 323 U.S. at 208-09 (emphasis added). There is a draft of this opinion in the
Murphy Papers that has many handwritten notes in the margins of additions and changes
from how Steele was published. Professor Gressman has identified the handwriting on this
draft as his. Letter from Eugene Gressman to MJP (December 31, 1998)(on file with au-
thor). One particular change of note is a line which reads: "Fortunately the Court has
construed the Railway Labor Act as not justifying or permitting these actions of the Broth-
erhood, thus saving the Act in this respect from invalidity under the Fifth Amendment."
This sentence was crossed out, and next to it was penciled in: "Thus if the Railway Labor
Act were construed to justify or permit this racial discrimination by the Brotherhood, the
Act in this respect would be invalid under the Fifth Amendment. Fortunately, the Court
has construed the Act otherwise." Murphy Papers, Reel 129. Both of these thoughts were
basically incorporated into the published opinion, by the paragraph quoted above in the
text and the following conclusion:
If the Court's construction of the statute rests upon this basis, I agree. But I am
not sure that such is the basis. Suffice it to say, however, that this constitutional
issue cannot be lightly dismissed. The cloak of racism surrounding the actions of
the Brotherhood in refusing membership to Negroes and in entering into and
enforcing agreements discriminating against them, all under the guise of Congres-
sional authority, still remains. No statutory interpretation can erase this ugly ex-
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Just as he had in Hirabayashi, Korematsu, and arguably Endo,
Murphy alone called for the application of an equal protection guar-
antee against federal discrimination which violated civil fights. Al-
though his argument for reading the guarantee into the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause was not as explicit in Steele as it
was in the Japanese-American Cases, the key point is that, once again,
Murphy was the lone voice on the Court advocating the adoption of
this doctrine. Professor Fine recognized this, but he did so almost in
passing, not quite grasping the important contribution Justice Murphy
had made: "Murphy was the first Supreme Court justice to hold that
union discrimination against a minority group whom it represented
under the law violated constitutional guarantees. He has been criti-
cized for not heeding 'the strong reasons for gradualism in breaking
new ground."""'
A nearly identical claim can and should be made in discussing
Justice Murphy's opinions in the Japanese-American Cases. In these
cases, as well as Steele, Murphy should in fact be praised for not heed-
ing "the strong reasons for gradualism in breaking new ground." '172
Buoyed by the courage of his convictions, Murphy boldly exposed ra-
cism wherever he found it and used the Constitution to condemn it.
Murphy was the first Supreme Court justice to suggest (as in Hiraba-
yashi) and then conclude (as in Korematsu) that the federal govern-
ment's discrimination against a racial minority group violated the
guarantee of equal protection of law found in the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. And, although legal commentary generally has
not recognized Murphy's contribution, history has vindicated Mur-
phy's views. A Washington Post's editorial regarding Steele echoed
ample of economic cruelty against colored citizens of the United States. Nothing
can destroy the fact that the accident of birth has been used as the basis to abuse
individual rights by an organization purporting to act in conformity with its Con-
gressional mandate. Any attempt to interpret the Act must take that fact into
account and must realize that the constitutionality of the statute in this respect
depends upon the answer given.
The Constitution voices its disapproval whenever economic discrimination is ap-
plied under authority of law against any race, creed or color. A sound democracy
cannot allow such discrimination to go unchallenged. Racism is far too virulent
today to permit the slightest refusal, in the light of a Constitution that abhors it,
to expose and condemn it wherever it appears in the course of a statutory
interpretation.
Steele, 323 U.S. at 209. The Murphy Papers contain no other drafts which elaborate on the
evolution of the opinion from these drafts to its published form.
171. FiNE, THE WASHINGTON YEARs, supra note 15, at 394. The "gradualism" criticism
is from Howard, supra note 15, at 352, who further wrote that Murphy's concurrence was a
clear example of his "judicial activism" which rejected "the Chief Justice's skillful blend of
statutory case law in support of the result." Id.
172. HowARD, supra note 15, at 352.
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this historical vindication, stating that although the Post "thought
'constitutional condemnation' unnecessary," the paper nevertheless
found the condemnation "heartening," as did others, that Murphy had
spoken out on the issue as he did.173
III. Justice Murphy's Influence on Fifth Amendment
Equal Protection
Although Murphy was the lone voice on the Court who expressly
called for the adoption of a Fifth Amendment Equal Protection doc-
trine - albeit from dissenting and concurring opinions, hardly the
strongest foundation from which an advocate would urge the adoption
of such an interpretation - Murphy's theory did not go unnoticed by
practitioners who argued cases before the Court during the years pre-
ceding Boiling.74 In several civil rights and liberties cases challenging
federal racial discrimination, advocates cited Justice Murphy's opin-
ions in the Japanese-American Cases and Steele to support their argu-
ments for Supreme Court adoption of the Court to adopt Fifth
Amendment Equal Protection.
In Korematsu, the appellant argued that the exclusion program
"den[ied] [Fred Korematsu] the equal protection of the laws which is
implicit in the due process clause of the 5th Amendment."'1 75 Al-
though this brief did not cite to Hirabayashi at all, amicus curiae briefs
filed on behalf of Korematsu did cite the Murphy concurrence. The
American Civil Liberties Union's brief argued that "the classification
of citizens based solely on ancestry is a denial of due process and is
forbidden by the Fifth Amendment." 176 Although it recognized that
the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, the ACLU
contended that
[n]evertheless, the due process clause of Fifth Amendment does
limit the power of the Federal Government in respect to classifi-
cation. (See Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337, and
cases cited). In the Hirabayashi case this Court recognized that
classification on racial grounds is ordinarily arbitrary. But the
Chief Justice concluded that the fact of racial ancestry was rele-
vant so as to justify the imposition of a curfew order on citizens
of Japanese origin only. But he was careful to point out that the
173. FINE, THE WASHINGTON YEARS, supra note 15, at 395.
174. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
175. See Brief for Appellant at 48, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
176. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union at 6, Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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Court did no more than determine the circumstances afforded a
reasonable basis for the action taken in imposing a curfew:
We decide only that the curfew order, as applied, at the time it
was applied, was within the boundaries of the war power.
And Mr. Justice Murphy, specially concurring, said that the deci-
sion then being rendered went "to the very brink of constitutional
power. ,177
The Japanese American Citizens League's amicus brief for Kore-
matsu also relied heavily on Murphy's Hirabayashi concurrence to
make its case against relocation, quoting extensively his "brink of con-
stitutional power" language and the Justice's skepticism as to the "rea-
sonableness of the [curfew program]" in its Fifth Amendment Equal
Protection argument. 178
In Steele, Charles Hamilton Houston, the famous NAACP lawyer
arguing for the appellant, stated that "the [Railway Labor] Act should
be so interpreted to avoid the necessity of deciding the constitutional
question that he also had presented.' 1 79 The constitutional argument
was that "unless the grant of power is to violate both the Fifth and
Thirteenth Amendments and place the Negro firemen in economic
serfdom to the Brotherhood, the grant must be subject to constitu-
tional restraints."' 8 Thus, Houston did not urge the Court to adopt a
Fifth Amendment Equal Protection guarantee against the federal gov-
ernment and, therefore, Murphy's Hirabayashi concurrence was not
mentioned. Houston probably chose this more conservative, Ashwan-
der-type of argument because he was more concerned simply with
winning Bester William Steele's specific case than obtaining a broader
doctrinal victory.''
However, whatever doubts Houston might have had about the
doctrine were erased when, four years later, he argued Hurd v.
Hodge82 before the Court. Hurd, a companion case to Shelley v.
177. Id. at 6-7 (emphasis added).
178. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Japanese American Citizens League at 5-6, Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
179. See Jack Greenberg, In Tribute: Charles Hamilton Houston, 111 HARv. L. REv.
2161, 2164 (1998).
180. Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiori at 17, Steele v. Louisville & Nash-
ville R. R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
181. For an excellent discussion of Steele, and particularly Murphy's concurrence, see J.
Clay Smith and E. Desmond Hogan, A Tribute to Charles Hamilton Houston:
Remembered Hero, Forgotten Contribution: Charles Hamilton Houston, Legal Realism,
and Labor Law, 14 HARV. BLAcKLErtER J. 1 (1998).
182. 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
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Kraemer,'83 challenged racially restrictive covenants in the District of
Columbia, where the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause had no application. In urging the Court to overturn the restric-
tive covenants on Fifth Amendment Equal Protection grounds,184
Houston's brief argued:
The opinions of this Court, particularly in recent years, have elo-
quently expressed the national policy against racial discriminat-
ing. Illustrative are the following decisions: Steele v. Louisville
& Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 203: ". .. discriminations
based on race alone are obviously irrelevant and invidious."
Justice Murphy concurring (at p. 208):
"The Constitution voices its disapproval whenever economic
discrimination is applied under authority of law against any
race, creed, or color. A sound democracy cannot allow such dis-
crimination to go unchallenged. Racism is far too virulent today
to permit the slightest refusal, in the light of the Constitution
that abhors it, to expose and condemn it whenever it appears in
the course of a statutory interpretation."' 85
The brief also quoted, among others, Justice Black's and Chief
Justice Stone's respective statements condemning racial discrimina-
tion in Korematsu and Hirabayashi.
In his Hurd reply brief, Houston continued to rely on Murphy's
concurrence in Steele to support his Fifth Amendment Equal Protec-
tion argument. The brief stated that "[f]reedom from racial discrimi-
nation by governmental power is a field especially protected under
our Constitution."' 86 A footnote to this statement followed the same
pattern as the original brief, citing Black and Stone's Korematsu and
Hirabayashi statements, and then citing both Stone and Murphy's
Steele opinions.'8 7
Hirabayashi, Korematsu, Endo, Steele, and Hurd are the only
cases that came before the Court challenging federal racial distinc-
tions prior to Bolling, and thus the only cases in which the challengers
to the distinctions argued for the adoption and application of a Fifth
183. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Shelley addressed state court enforcement under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause of the once widely used practice of restrictive cove-
nants, agreements among property owners to exclude persons of designated races. See
Gunther, supra note 16, at 899.
184. Houston's Fifth Amendment Due Process argument centered on a deprivation of
the rights of white sellers' and black buyers' of property. The racial component to this
argument is the key to it, so although Houston did not make his Fifth Amendment argu-
ment in the explicit terms of equal protection guarantees through the Due Process Clause,
there can be no mistaking that this is what he was really doing.
185. Brief for Appellant at 117, Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
186. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 16, Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948)
187. See id.
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Amendment Equal Protection guarantee.188 With the exception of
Hurd,189 the contributions of Justice Murphy to the legal discussion of
188. In United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947), the respondents "contended that the
statute Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 506, denies equal protection of the laws
to radio-broadcasting employees as a class, and, for this reason, violates the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment." There was no citation here to any of the Murphy opin-
ions above to support this claim, although Petrillo's brief did cite Yount, supra note 21, and
Stone's Hirabayashi language that the Fifth Amendment restrains "such discriminatory
legislation by Congress as amounts to a denial of due process." Brief for Appellee at 61,
United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947). The fact that this economic case did not cite
Murphy doesn't really detract from the importance of his opinions in leading to Boiling
because, as continually stressed above, the distinction between economic cases and civil
rights and liberties cases is key to understanding the difference between Murphy's contri-
bution to the doctrine, separating it from the Detroit Bank progeny that came before it.
Additionally, Justice Black's majority opinion explicitly rejected Petrillo's Fifth Amend-
ment Equal Protection argument, on the sound reasoning that "it is not within [the
Court's] province to say that because Congress has prohibited some [economic] practices
within its power to prohibit, it must prohibit all within its power." Petrillo, 332 U.S. at 8.
189. It should be noted that the Hurd Court declined Houston's invitation to adopt
Fifth Amendment Equal Protection, choosing instead to decide the case on statutory
grounds in adherence to Ashwander. See Hurd, 334 U.S. at 30 ("Upon full consideration,
however, we have found it unnecessary to resolve the constitutional issue which petitioners
advance; for we have concluded that judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants by the
courts of the District of Columbia is improper for other reasons hereafter stated.").
Justice Murphy went along with this choice and joined Chief Justice Vimson's majority
opinion. Why did he pass up this golden opportunity to make another strong push for the
adoption of the Fifth Amendment Equal Protection, especially in this case where racism
was just as "virulent," as it had been in Steele? Professor Gressman, in retrospect, perhaps
has provided the best answer: "I can only guess, at this late date, that Murphy did not want
to disturb or weaken the effect of a 6-man decision, which constitutes a quorum of the
Court. 3 Justices were out of the case. [Justices Rutledge, Jackson, and Reed all recused
themselves from the case]. These opinions were written by Vimson's clerk, Francis Allen...
We thought then, and I think now, the Shelley and Hurd opinions were the best that could
be had at this point in time." Letter from Eugene Gressman to MJP (December 31, 1998)
(on file with author). Certainly, as shown by his decision to concur rather than dissent in
Hirabayashi in part because of his concern for Court unity, Murphy was willing at times to
subordinate his desire to write separately even though he believed the Court hadn't con-
demned the challenged racism in strong enough terms. It could also be that Justice Mur-
phy, remembering the violent rage that race and housing incited during the infamous
Sweet trials which he presided over back in Detroit in 1925-26, was even more attuned to
the need of the Court to provide a united front on this volatile issue. See SDNEY FiEM,
FRANK MuRPHY: THE DETorr YEARS 145-70 (1975). As Professor Gressman reflected
upon Murphy's death: "It was a source of great satisfaction to him that the Court met the
issue squarely and was able to present a united front against the use of the judicial process
to effectuate such a blatant racial discrimination." See Gressman, A Preliminary Appraisal,
supra note 13, at 36. Finally, Murphy suffered from numerous illnesses which caused him
to miss a great deal of the 1947 and 1948 terms. This "reduced his productivity and left him
a rather frustrated justice.... He wrote only 18 of the 224 Court opinions during these
terms, as well as 15 dissents and 3 concurrences." FINE, THE WAS-INGTON YEARS, supra
note 15, at 485. Thus, one can speculate that Murphy's poor health may have contributed
to his failure to independently advocate the use of the Fifth Amendment Equal Protection
in Hurd as he had in the Japanese-American Cases and Steele.
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Fifth Amendmeni Equal Protection in these important cases, while
perhaps not rising to the level of substantial, were not entirely negligi-
ble. Legal advocates, the media, and court watchers in general no-
ticed, if not his specific argument that the doctrine should be adopted,
at least his unwillingness to allow the federal government or those
acting under the authority of federal law to escape the duty of provid-
ing equal protection of the laws for all racial minorities.190 Murphy
thus deserves at least some credit for influencing the continued vitality
of the doctrine leading up to its eventual adoption in Bolling.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Justice Murphy had an un-
mistakable influence - indeed a strong case can be made that he had
the most influence of any justice - on the briefs filed in support of
Spotswood Thomas Bolling, the petitioner challenging segregation of
the District of Columbia's public schools in Bolling v. Sharpe. Mur-
phy's opinions in the Japanese-American Cases are cited four times by
the NAACP brief - more than any other Supreme Court Justice's
opinion - to support the NAACP's contention that segregation in the
District was unconstitutional.
In the brief's Fifth Amendment Due Process passage, the brief's
first and arguably most important argument, the NAACP asserted:
"One of the constitutional guarantees, which petitioners may not law-
fully be deprived of the benefit of, is that as citizens no distinctions be
made between them and other citizens because of race or color
alone."'191 The brief supported this position by citing citations to
Chief Justice Stone's and Justice Murphy's Hirabayashi opinions:
190. For example, the Frank Murphy Papers contain a letter sent to Chief Justice Stone
from a St. Louis attorney which contained the following commentary on Hirabayashi:
With all due respect to you, Mr. Chief Justice, and to the Court, I must say that I
find the Court enunciating in this case a most amazing doctrine for application to
the relation between the Federal Government and its citizens.
On [page 100 of the opinion], I find the Court, through you, stating this principle:
"Because racial discriminations are in most circumstances irrelevant and there-
fore prohibited, it by no means follows that, in dealing with the perils of war,
Congress and the Executive are wholly precluded from taking into account those
facts and circumstances which are relevant to measures for our national defense
and for the successful prosecution of the war, and which may in fact place citizens
of one ancestry in a different category from others."
I agree with what Mr. Associate Justice Murphy said [on page 110 of the opinion]:
"Distinctions based on color and ancestry are utterly inconsistent with our tradi-
tions and ideals. They are at variance with the principles for which we are now
waging war."
Letter from William L. Mason to Harlan Fiske Stone (July 24, 1943) in FM Papers, Reel
127.
191. Brief for Petitioners at 11, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
This Court, in Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100
(1943) said:
"Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry
are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institu-
tions are founded upon the doctrine of equality. For that reason,
legislative classification or discrimination based on race alone
has often been held to be a denial of equal protection..."
In that same case, in a concurring opinion where this Court up-
held the deprivation of the liberty of 70,000 under a war-time
curfew law, Mr. Justice Murphy said at page 111:
"The result is the creation in this country of two classes of citi-
zens for the purposes of a critical and perilous hour - to sanction
discrimination between groups of United States citizens on the
basis of ancestry. In my opinion this goes to the very brink of
constitutional power.
Except under conditions of great emergency a regulation of this
kind applicable solely to citizens of a particular racial extraction
would not be regarded as in accord with the requirement of due
process of law contained in the Fifth Amendment. We have con-
sistently held that attempts to apply regulatory action to particu-
lar groups solely on the basis of racial distinction or
classification is not in accordance with due process of law as pre-
scribed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments . ". ."192
Thus, Murphy's opinion - in addition to Chief Justice Stone's - is
expressly and heavily relied on in the first major argument of Boiling's
brief. There is simply no plausible way that Chief Justice Warren
could have avoided noticing this citation and, thus, his failure to men-
tion Murphy's opinion in Boiling can not be dismissed as a mere acci-
dent or oversight. 93
192. l1 at 11-12.
193. The brief immediately followed this quote with the following argument: "Another
constitutional guarantee, which minor petitioners may not lawfully be deprived of, is the
right to go to Sousa Junior High School without any limitations based solely upon race or
color." To support this somewhat attenuated right-to-travel contention, the NAACP again
relied on Justice Murphy:
Mr. Justice Murphy, in a concurring opinion in Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 308
(1944), said:
"For the Government to suggest under these circumstances that the presence of
Japanese blood in a loyal American citizen might be enough to warrant her exclu-
sion from a place where she would otherwise have a right to go is a position I
cannot sanction."
In the instant case minor petitioners would have a right to go to Sousa Junior
High School but for respondents' action in excluding them solely because of their
race or color, and action forbidden by the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
Id. at 12.
Later in its brief, the NAACP brief twice cited Murphy's concurrence in Oyama v. Califor-
nia, 332 U.S. 633 (1948), a challenge to California's alien land exclusion law, twice. The
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Moreover, the NAACP concluded its brief with this strong
argument:
Government action has passed beyond the brink of constitution-
ality when it imposes disabilities upon Negro people, loyal in
war and peace, native born citizens, limiting their liberty of
choice of schools solely because of their race or color. This
Court has approved of comparable federal action only when the
fate of the Nation was at stake, and even then, it subjected the
Government's action to a searching inquiry and laid down defi-
nite standards which the Government was required to meet.
The actions of respondents in the instant case not only were not
taken under such perilous circumstances, but did not meet even
the minimum standards set for imposing racial distinctions
under those conditions. 194
It is difficult to overlook the striking similarity this language
bears to Murphy's Hirabayashi and Korematsu opinions. Clearly, the
NAACP borrowed Murphy's "brink of constitutionality" metaphor
from those opinions and used it to drive home its argument that segre-
gated schools in the District of Columbia violated the Fifth
Amendment.195
Thus, Justice Murphy's influence is evident in both the opening
and closing arguments of the NAACP brief. Murphy's influence could
first supported its argument that segregation on the basis of race constituted an arbitrary
punishment on African-American children on account of their color: "Mr. Justice Murphy,
in a concurring opinion in Oyama v. California, supra observed that no rational basis for
legislation existed where laws discriminating against citizens were motivated by racial ha-
tred and intolerance." Id. at 45.
The second Oyama reference was included in the NAACP's argument that segregation
violated Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter:
In one of the concurring opinions, Mr. Justice Murphy, with whom Mr. Justice
Rutledge joined, outlined the discriminatory aspects of the statute, examined the
embarrassing history, and stated at page 673:
"Moreover, this nation has recently pledged itself, through the United Nations
Charter, to promote respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language and religion. The
Alien Land Law stands as a barrier to the fulfillment of that national pledge. Its
inconsistency with the Charter, which has been duly ratified and adopted by the
United States, is but one more reason why the statute must be condemned.
"And so in origin, purpose, administration and effect, the Alien Land Law
does violence to the high ideals of the Constitution of the United States and the
Charter of the United Nations..
Id. at 57-58.
194. ld. at 65.
195. See Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 111 (Murphy, J., concurring) ("In my opinion, this
[ancestry-based curfew restriction] goes to the very brink of constitutional power."); Kore-
matsu, 323 U.S. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting) ("Such an exclusion [of all persons of Japa-
nese ancestry] goes over 'the very brink of constitutional power' and falls into the ugly
abyss of racism.").
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not have escaped Chief Justice Warren as he - with advice from Jus-
tice Black - wrote his Boiling opinion. 196 Nothing could make the
point more readily apparent, despite the absence of any direct citation
to him in Boiling, than the NAACP's heavy reliance on Justice Mur-
phy that Murphy deserves at least some credit for "point[ing] the way
to the adoption by the Court of the doctrine of fifth amendment equal
protection. '197
IV. Why Justice Murphy?
It really should come as little surprise that Frank Murphy was
among the first Supreme Court Justices to suggest and then actually
apply a Fifth Amendment Equal Protection guarantee against federal
invasions of civil rights. In his personal life and professional career,
Murphy had many experiences from which to draw a healthy distrust
of government oppression. In fact, his fierce protection of vulnerable
racial and ethnic minority groups was a staple of his entire public life.
Thus, when given the opportunity to use the Constitution to extend
equal protection of law to Japanese-Americans and African-Ameri-
cans, Justice Murphy was unlikely to allow the lack of an express pro-
vision in the Bill of Rights guaranteeing such equal treatment to
prevent him from finding a way to guarantee equal protection for all
Americans. 98
A. Frank Murphy: The Progressive Politician
Murphy's heritage would not allow him to "remain silent in the
face of wrong."'199 His great-grandfather was accused of insurrection
and hanged by the British, his paternal grandparents were "Forty-
Eighters" from County Mayo, and his father, a Democratic lawyer in
196. Perhaps it should be noted that Murphy's opinions apparently were not discussed
in either of Bolling's two rounds of oral argument before the Court, although the NAACP
counsel expressly discussed the Japanese-American Cases in at least the first argument
before the Vinson Court in 1952. See Kluger, supra note 25, at 577-80; 676-77. This really
doesn't detract from the argument that Warren consciously ignored Murphy's opinions,
since the written briefs have always taken precedence in importance over oral arguments
according to Court experts.
197. Karst, supra note 23, at 544.
198. Many of the following observations have already been identified by other com-
mentators trying to explain why Justice Murphy took the positions he did in these and
other cases. Some of the more notable ones, in addition to Professor Fine's exhaustive
biography - every fiber of it justifying the results reached in these cases, one could argue -
are IRONS, supra note 7, at 242-43; Scanlon, supra note 14, at 8-13; Kerr, supra note 70, at
12-14. Thurman W. Arnold, Mr. Justice Murphy, 63 HARv. L. REv. 289, 290-92 (1949).
199. HowARD, supra note 15, at 6.
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the Republican-dominated town of Sand Beach, Michigan,2°° was
jailed as a youth in Canada for participating in the Fenian distur-
bances of 1866.201 His mother's devout Catholicism instilled a zealous
sincerity in Murphy to put the Golden Rule into action, teaching him
that "the most precious virtue of all is the desire to serve mankind '20 2
and rearing him in an egalitarian tradition which "never forg[o]t the
obligation of the strong toward the weak. '2 3
Murphy implemented these ideals throughout his public life.
Among other leaders in his era, it would be hard to find a more sym-
pathetic fighter for the "down-trodden people and the people of the
lower classes... [in] their struggles for social and industrial uplift"2°4
than Murphy. 0 5 Shortly before he died, Murphy wrote: "Instead of
children, which I have been denied, I have.., a distressed minority
group or an unhappy friend awaiting me. All of it sums up happiness
to me. I love to help .... 206 That affection was reciprocated by the
people whom Murphy helped, as he always received electoral support
from ethnic and racial minorities when running for office,207 and
praise from concerned organizations like the ACLU, NAACP, and
United Jewish Appeal when serving as a Supreme Court Justice.20 8
While working as a young lawyer in Detroit, Murphy taught night
school as part of the Americanization campaign undertaken by the
200. Now Harbor Beach, Michigan.
201. See HowARD, supra note 15, at 4.
202. Id. at 5.
203. Id. at 6.
204. FINE, Tim DETRoIT YEARS, supra note 189, at 178.
205. Justice Frankfurter once compiled a list of "F.M.'s Clients" which humorously
manifested this statement: "Reds, Whores, Crooks, Indians and all other Colored people,
Longshoremen, M'gors and other Debtors, R.R. employees, Pacifists, Traitors, Japs, Wo-
men, Children, Most men." See Eugene Gressman, The Controversial Image of Mr. Justice
Murphy, 47 GEo. L. J. 631, 639-40 (1959). The fact that this list comprehensively covers
the litigants who Justice Murphy sympathized with in the cases discussed in this article is
obvious.
206. Fun, Tim Dnrnorr YEARS, supra note 189, at 178.
207. One African-American Michigan newspaper declared that "[it was] the duty of
every Negro to vote and work for [Murphy's] re-election" in the 1938 gubernatorial race.
See SiDNEY FINE, Tim NEw DEA.L YEARs 493 (1979).
208. Then-NAACP Special Counsel Thurgood Marshall echoed this in his tribute, Mr.
Justice Murphy and Civil Rights, 48 MICH. L. R1v. 745 (1950):
[I]n the field of civil rights, Mr. Justice Murphy was a zealot. To him, the primacy
of civil rights and human equality in our law and their entitlement to every possi-
ble protection in each case, regardless of competing considerations, was a fighting
faith.. . But Mr. Justice Murphy's orientation in matters of civil liberties was
fixed. His sense of values was unchanging. He followed wherever his abiding
conviction of the primacy of civil rights might lead.
Detroit Board of Commerce. His students were primarily Armenians
of Delray. Murphy and his students inevitably formed a strong bond.
Murphy helped familiarize his students with the mysterious English
language and social and economic life in America. Murphy also de-
fended his students' rights to preserve and observe their own ethnic
customs and traditions.20 9 The sentiments of his students can be sym-
bolized by a letter from one of his former Armenian students which
warmly concluded, "I know you my broder [sic]." 210
As a judge in Detroit's Recorder's Court, Murphy always took
special care to alleviate the hardships faced by those who came before
him, especially for immigrants who did not speak English or fully un-
derstand the legal process. "handicap of the newcomer... [in the]
uphill fight in any court of justice," especially for those immigrants
who did not speak English or fully understand the legal process. Mur-
phy's even-handedness towards all who came before him earned the
respectful reputation as a "soft" judge, especially among the
thousands of Poles, Hungarians, Italians, Armenians, and Jews of De-
troit.2 ' Murphy served on the advisory board of the Detroit Council
for Protection of Foreign Born Workers in 1928, was instrumental in
founding the American Anti-Bigotry Committee in the mid-1940s,
and was a Christian spokesman for the United Jewish Appeal.
212
Of all the disadvantaged minority groups, Murphy perhaps had
the greatest empathy for African-Americans, because "they are so out
of luck and get the worst of every deal. '213 Murphy recognized the
unequal treatment blacks received, observing that "[t]he equal citizen-
ship of the colored man, even though politicians throw him sops in the
form of 'civil rights' statutes, is as much a myth today as in the days of
slavery. "214 Murphy strove to change this reality: "To me, there is but
the human family. Class and caste and race and creed I struggle to
eliminate. 21 5
In no case was this more apparent than in the famous Sweet trials
of 1925-26, a murder trial of 11 African-Americans charged with
shooting into a mob of whites that attacked a family who dared to
integrate a white Detroit neighborhood. Young Judge Murphy pre-
209. See FINE, TiE WASHINGTON YEARS, supra note 15, at 179.
210. SIDNEY FINE, FRANK MuRPHY: A MICHIGAN LInE 3 (1985). This student obvi-
ously meant "brother."
211. FINE, THE DETRorr YEARS, supra note 189, at 179.
212. See id. at 230-233.
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sided over these highly-charged cases and his conduct earned him the
praise of progressives throughout the country. Clarence Darrow, the
lead defense attorney, called Murphy "the kindliest and most under-
standing man I ever happened to meet on the bench" and remarked
that "it was the first time in all my career where a judge really tried to
help, and displayed a sympathetic interest in saving poor devils from
the extreme forces of the law, rather than otherwise." '216 David Lil-
ienthal, editor of Nation, hailed the proceedings as "probably the fair-
est [trial] ever accorded a Negro in this country." '217
The Sweet trial endeared Murphy to Detroit's black community.
African-Americans were faithful Murphy supporters throughout his
public career, helping Murphy form a winning coalition with ethnic
groups and organized labor which-in turn-propelled him to victo-
ries in Detroit mayoral and Michigan gubernatorial elections in the
1930s. Murphy's Depression-relief programs as mayor were among
the most progressive in America, as he realized that the plight of out-
of-work blacks was usually even worse than that of similarly-situated
whites. Murphy formed a Colored Advisory Committee which moni-
tored programs to ensure that relief was distributed without regard to
"race, creed, or color." '218 Though not without problems, the effort
was fairly successful at limiting widespread discrimination in city gov-
ernment. Murphy's gubernatorial administration included several Af-
rican-Americans who held the highest-ranked positions in Michigan
history and documented record numbers of blacks on the government
payroll.2 9 An African-American newspaper wrote of the Murphy
governorship: "Never before in the history of America has a State
Administration so clearly demonstrated by actual appointments that
they believe in equal opportunity and fair recognition for all, regard-
less of race, creed, or color."22 ° Murphy later became an NAACP
board member.
Murphy also served as President Roosevelt's Governor General
of the Philippines from 1932-36. These years helped shape his view of
peoples of other cultures, especially those of the often misunderstood
Asian lands. Murphy rejected colonial beliefs and practices and en-
couraged the Filipino movement for independence, successfully bro-
kering the peaceful transfer to independence and earning the title of
216. HowARD, supra note 15, at 28.
217. FInE, Tim DE-TRorr YEARS, supra note 189, at 163.
218. Id. at 287-288.
219. See Fnr, THE NEw DEAL YEAns, supra note 207, at 278-79.
220. See id. at 279.
the people's "best advocate" and "truest friend."22 1 Through his dedi-
cated and just service in the Philippines, "Frank Murphy and the Fili-
pino people established an affair of the heart from which neither fully
recovered." 2  In addition, there was a fairly large Japanese popula-
tion in the Philippines during Murphy's service and he developed a
respect and understanding for the Japanese people that few Wes-
terners possessed.2'
Murphy's experience in the federal government also shaped his
views of governmental power, and by the time he joined the Supreme
Court, he was well-aware of the already-existing potential for federal
agencies to abuse civil rights. As U.S. Attorney General from 1939-
1940, Murphy presided during a period of considerable activity as Eu-
rope exploded into war and America felt internal and external pres-
sures to get involved. Heading the "the largest law office in the
world" and the chief enforcement arm of the federal government,
Murphy had firsthand knowledge of the immense power the federal
government wielded, as well as its potential for violating citizens' civil
rights and liberties. However as Professor Fine pointed out, Murphy
tried to balance the tension between national security and individual
liberty:
"In a time of 'national emergency,"' the American Civil Liber-
ties Union (ACLU) observed in its report for 1939-40, "the De-
partment of Justice becomes at once the powerful agency of
government either for the protection or invasion of civil rights."
No one was more aware of this fact than Attorney General Mur-
phy, who as a federal attorney in Michigan during the Red Scare
of 1919-20 had seen the Justice Department trammel upon the
rights of the individual. From the time war broke out in Europe
and led to a "miniature Red Scare" in the United States until he
left the attorney generalship, Murphy sounded one insistent
note: the Justice Department would do what was necessary to
protect the nation against espionage, sabotage, and internal sub-
version, but it would not violate the civil liberties of the individ-
ual in the process.224
Consistent with this theme, in February 1939, Murphy created the
Civil Liberties Unit (CLU)225 as a part of the Justice Department's
221. See id. at 81-82.
222. HoWARD, supra note 15, at 117.
223. Murphy "thought that Americans were extraordinarily na'fve about the Far
East .... He was impressed with 'the energy of character, the discipline, capacity to
sacrifice, [the] enterprise and above all the simplicity of life among the Japanese ...
FiNE, THE NEw DEAL YEARS, supra note 207, at 104.
224. FINE, THE WASBINGTON YEARS, supra note 15, at 111.
225. The CLU was later renamed the Civil Rights Division, as it remains today.
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Criminal Division. This unit's charge was "to study the relevant por-
tions of the Constitution and the federal statutes, make appropriate
recommendations regarding them, and prosecute violators of federally
protected civil rights. '22 6 Murphy wanted to use the considerable
power of the Justice Department to protect civil rights and liberties
from state and local government incursions. He specifically pledged
the federal government "to protect civil liberties for... the people of
all racial extractions in our midst."' 7 For example, Murphy author-
ized the Justice Department's amicus curiae brief on behalf of black
Congressman Adrian Mitchell of Illinois, who challenged an Arkan-
sas' "Jim Crow" statute - and the Interstate Commerce Commission's
rejection of his challenge - which had required him to move from a
well-equipped railcar he had boarded in Illinois into a car reserved for
African-Americans once he crossed into Arkansas. 2 The Supreme
Court unanimously struck down the Arkansas law.2 9 Thus, the Mur-
phy Justice Department, and the CLU in particular, manifested the
Janus-faced role of Justice discussed in the ACLU report.
During Murphy's tenure at the Justice Department, he con-
fronted many situations which put civil rights and liberties in jeopardy
of federal violation. Murphy made many decisions regarding finger-
printing and wiretapping by federal agencies, both widely-used weap-
ons of surveillance. When faced with these difficult and potentially
dangerous decisions, Attorney General Murphy sometimes "proved
to be something other than the uncompromising defender of civil lib-
226. FinE, Tim WASHINGTO N YEARS, supra note 15, at 79.
227. Fine, Mr. Justice Murphy and the Hirabayashi Case, supra note 14, at 201.
228. KLUGER, supra note 25, at 220. The Justice Department's brief made a very Mur-
phy-like argument when it stated:
[T]he distribution of commerce powers between state and nation cannot proceed
upon mathematical formulae. The task of this Court under the Constitution is
one of adjustment and reconciliation. In performance of this task it cannot, of
course, ignore other provisions of the Constitution. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments set up a constitutional policy against racial discrimi-
nation. Those amendments have been held not to contain any specific prohibitions
against racial segregation. But, while they fall short of a specific prohibition, they
remain as a factor which must be weighed in the commerce clause adjustments.
There is, in other words, no occasion to permit state power to reach into the field
of interstate commerce in order to accomplish an end at variance with basic policy
of the Amendments.
Memorandum for the United States at 11-12, Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941)
(emphasis added). As he would later do himself as a Supreme Court Justice, Murphy
found a way to make an argument against racial discrimination without the textual ground-
ing of a "specific prohibition" from the Constitution. Of course, by the time this case
reached the Court, Murphy was already sitting on the bench and was part of the unani-
mous Court which struck the Arkansas statute down.
229. See Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941).
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erties he had appeared to be" prior to assuming the reigns of Jus-
tice."3 One can speculate that just a few years later, when considering
whether other federal officials - men that he knew were not as com-
mitted in the first instance to the protection of civil rights and liberties
as he was - should be restrained by an equal protection guarantee,
Justice Murphy concluded that they must be. After all, if even he
could be swayed into the use of such invasive techniques in the name
of national security, then surely others could be, too. To guard against
this, protections must be afforded to civil rights and liberties from the
federal as well as state governments.
For example, although Murphy had a cordial public relationship
with FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, privately their association was
"considerably strained." 1 Towards the end of Murphy's tenure as
Attorney General, the strain increased "probably because of differ-
ences stemming from the federal government's effort to combat sub-
version and potential subversion after war broke out in Europe.""
Hoover's anti-subversion methods were more intrusive than Murphy
would have liked, even as Murphy continued to authorize and publicly
support the Director's efforts. Moreover, shortly after President
Roosevelt had appointed Murphy as Attorney General, Hoover had
"opened a secret file" on Murphy. 3 Although it is not clear that
Murphy knew about the file, it is probably safe to assume that he was
attuned to the considerable power that Hoover and his agents held
over he and other high-ranking governmental officials. Murphy's
awareness of Hoover's broad power might have influenced the future
Justice's willingness to extend an equal protection guarantee against
federal interference."14
Another federal body that Murphy pinpointed as a threat to the
civil rights and liberties of all citizens was the House Un-American
Activities Committee (HUAC), chaired by Rep. Martin Dies (D-
230. Fn, n, Tim WASHINGTON YEARS, supra note 15, at 98.
231. Id. at 20.
232. Id
233. Id.
234. It is interesting to note that the FBI took issue with many of the rationalizations
for and conclusions of General DeWitt's Final Report upon performing its own investiga-
tion which directly rejected the Final Report's specific allegations of sabotage and espio-
nage by Japanese-Americans, concluding that "the present military situation does not at
this time require the removal of American citizens of the Japanese race." Irons, supra note
7, at 44, 52, 280-81. Nevertheless, for purposes of this article, Murphy was certainly aware
of other instances where the FBI did engage in constitutional violations of citizens' rights
to justify his skepticism and desire to designate an equal protection guarantee from the
agency.
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Texas). Murphy was a "prime target of the Dies Committee" during
the Michigan gubernatorial campaign of 1938,5 primarily because of
his support for autoworkers during the great Flint Sit-Down Strike of
1937 and the subsequent endorsement his re-election campaign re-
ceived from the Michigan Communist Party." 6 Only weeks before
the election, HUAC held hearings on the Sit-Down Strike in Washing-
ton. The hearings were a carefully orchestrated political lynching, in
which "[a] parade of witnesses, not a single one friendly to Murphy,
testified [to] 'effectively smear[ ]' Murphy. ' '11 7 Although Governor
Murphy tried to deflect the attacks, denouncing them as "un-Ameri-
can and vicious... untruths"" 8 led by a chairman who was "running
errands for the same vested interests [who were] determined to block
every progressive measure advanced by the New Deal," 9 many be-
lieved that that the one-sided hearing "was a severe blow to the Mur-
phy campaign."2 40 Indeed, Murphy lost the 1938 election. As
Attorney General, he continued to be leery of Dies' committee. Al-
though he urged the Justice Department's cooperation with HUAC
and held his own healthy desire to protect America against threats
posed by communism and fascism during the early years of WW II,
Murphy "held Dies in low esteem and deprecated the investigation
methods employed by his committee ... in part because he feared that
HUAC would seek to discredit liberal and progressive organizations
and individuals, not just subversive elements." '24 Thus, Murphy was
personally aware of the political trauma HUAC could inflict on any
citizen or group.
B. Frank Murphy: The Supreme Court Justice
Simply pointing out "Frank Murphy the Progressive Politician's"
experiences does not sufficiently show how "Frank Murphy the Su-
preme Court Justice" was able to use Fifth Amendment Equal Protec-
tion as he did in the Japanese-American Cases and in Steele. Murphy,
his jurisprudence shaped in great part by his personal experiences, still
had to justify his constitutional approach and its results. Clues from
his larger judicial philosophy can help explain his opinions in these
cases.
235. Fnq, THE WASHINGTON YEARS, supra note 15, at 99.
236. See FiwE, THE NEw DEAL YEARS, supra note 207, at 499-500, 502-07.
237. Id. at 503.
238. Id. at 504.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 505.
241. Fin, THE WASHNGTON YEARS, supra note 15, at 100.
In Adamson v. California (1947),242 the Court - particularly Jus-
tices Frankfurter and Black - engaged in a famous dialogue regarding
selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause and the subsequent application of
the Bill of Rights to the states. The case involved the Self-Incrimina-
tion Clause of the Fifth Amendment; no racial issues were at bar. In a
brief concurrence, Justice Murphy stated his philosophy:
I agree that the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights should
be carried over intact into the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment. But I am not prepared to say that the latter is en-
tirely and necessarily limited by the Bill of Rights. Occasions
may arise where a proceeding falls so far short of conforming to
fundamental standards of procedure as to warrant constitutional
condemnation in terms of a lack of due process despite the ab-
sence of a specific provision in the Bill of Right. 243
This famous statement2' perhaps sheds some light on Justice
Murphy's willingness to find an equal protection guarantee "despite
the absence of a specific provision in the Bill of Rights" or in the Fifth
Amendment. As the Court had long pointed out, there was no ex-
plicit Equal Protection Clause that applied to the federal government.
The Court, however, had long indicated that discrimination might be
of "such an injurious character as to bring into operation the due pro-
cess clause of the Fifth Amendment."'245 Murphy, although not gener-
ally recognized as one of the Court's more creative members,24 6 took
242. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
243. Id. at 124 (emphasis added).
244. Professor Gunther has described this as something of a "having your cake and
eating it too" position. Gunther, supra note 16, at 417 n.3. Professor Kerr dubbed it "a
more expansive and flexible concept of due process, what might be called 'total incorpora-
tion plus."' Kerr, supra note 70, at 5. Professor Howard called this dissent "a remarkable
performance," and thoroughly discussed its ramifications. HoWARD, supra note 15, at 440-
43.
245. Currin, 306 U.S. at 14.
246. In fact, his legal skills have never been accorded much acclaim by commentators,
although most acknowledge that his heart was always in the right place and that his passion
was matched by few. Professor Gressman's 1959 article, The Controversial Image of Mr.
Justice Murphy, supra note 201, is a spirited defense of Justice Murphy's jurisprudence
which answered many of the criticisms leveled at the Justice. If this article was perhaps
understandably biased in favor of Justice Murphy - Murphy once called Gressman "one of
the most superb characters that I have met in my lifetime," FINE, Tim WAsHINGToN
YEARS, supra note 15, at 163 - then one should consider the account given by a perhaps
more impartial observer, Professor Thurman Arnold, in appraising Murphy:
In connection with Justice Murphy's skills as a legal craftsman, I recall being in-
terviewed by a layman, a writer of national prominence, who was preparing an
article on the Court. He had already seen a number of legal experts who had
informed him that Justice Murphy was an accident that had happened on the
Court. The judgment of the experts found the Justice wanting as a legal crafts-
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the initiative to find this injurious discrimination. Using the wonder-
ful vagaries of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, Murphy
condemned the racism at issue in the Japanese-American Cases and
Steele as unconstitutional, and perhaps his statement in Adamson pro-
vides something of a de facto explanation of how Justice Murphy was
able to do manipulate these vagaries.
Moreover, as Professor J. Woodford Howard explained, Justice
Murphy "doggedly, and sometimes savagely"247  argued that
"[n]othing short of 'constitutional condemnation,' he declared again
and again, was fit to denounce evidence of racial discrimination at the
bar." '248 Murphy developed the "special, symbolic theory to oppose
racism"249 in Steele, as discussed above, and in other cases like Akins
v. Texas (1945),250 Malinsky v. New York (1945),251 and Oyama v. Cal-
ifornia (1948).Y2 "As a rule," Murphy told his brother George, "the
Court is ticklish about involving the Constitution if the case can be
decided on any other grounds. For my part, I want to utilize the great
charter wherever it is necessary to sustain the rights of man. ' 253 Mur-
phy's crusade did not garner many corresponding majority opinions,
man. I told him to read Murphy's opinions for himself. He came back aston-
ished. He said that he had discovered that Murphy's writing was better than most
judicial writing. It did not have the fault common to judicial opinions of spinning
like a pinwheel, shooting off observations and formulas in all directions, and then
slowly dying away to a conclusion. He told me that Murphy's opinions had a
beginning and a middle and an end; that they were informed with a distinctive
and personal style born of sincerity and conviction. He thought that as a writer
Murphy had made an outstanding contribution to the Court; that he had an in-
stinct for going to the substance of a controversy and that his conclusions were
usually right.
Mr. Justice Murphy was a great judge because of three qualities. The first was
simplicity; the second was courage; the third was insight into the substance of the
problems of the changing times in which he lived.
Arnold, supra note 194, at 292-93. See also Professor Kerr's defense of Justice Murphy's
jurisprudence, supra note 70, as well as John P. Roche's The Utopian Pilgrimage of Mr.
Justice Murphy, 10 VAND. L. Rsv. 369 (1957).
247. HowARD, supra note 15, at 353.
248. Id. at 352.
249. Id.
250. 325 U.S. 398, 407 (1945) (objecting to the Court's inaction before evidence of sys-
tematic inclusion of a single African-American to meet equal protection standards).
251. 324 U.S. 401, 433-34 (1945) (denouncing a prosecutor for making alleged racial
references to a jury).
252. 332 U.S. 633, 650-74 (1948) (exposing the racism of underlying California's alien
land exclusion law). See Randall Kennedy, Justice Murphy's Concurrence in Oyama v.
California: Cussing Out, 74 TEx. L. REv. 1245 (1996). See also Takahashi v. Fish and
Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (denouncing the racial animosity behind a Califor-
nia law excluding fishing licenses from resident aliens).
253. HowARD, supra note 15, at 353.
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but, as Howard discussed, it did establish his position as one of the
Court's greatest protectors of civil rights:
The fact that he spoke infrequently for the Court on a subject of
such personal concern was not merely a function of style but
that his colleagues saw the problems of judicial action as far
more complex... [P]ositive judicial action clashed with compet-
ing constitutional values that could not be ignored. The federal
government, after all, was a latecomer in pressing for racial
equality in its own house, not to mention the states. Concepts
and statutes required considerable stretching to provide even
nonconstitutional remedies, much less constant constitutional
relief. [For example,] "Here is gross wrong," the Chief Justice
remarked in Steele. "The only question is can courts handle it."
But for Murphy the very statement carried its answer. "The
light of human freedom burns far too dimly to warrant ignoring
any opportunity, however modest, to increase its intensity," he
declared in an unpublished reply. "The least we can do is voice
the Constitution's disapproval of such action." Because the
cases [involving racial discrimination] invariably presented
wrongs and opportunities for preachment Justice Murphy be-
came a constant irritant on a Court engaged in probing the
boundaries of its authority on race relations. Piercing the con-
science with stubborn facts, he tore at traditional limits on fed-
eral judicial power.-54
Professor Gressman echoed this general theme: "I think that
Murphy's strong 'convictions'" 5 about the unconstitutionality of race
accounts for this phenomenon. Remember, this was the beginning of
the modern resurrection of the Equal Protection Clause. The Court
(and Murphy) was just beginning to apply that constitutional concept
to the racial cases." 6 Justice Murphy took the lead in this "resurrec-
tion" and he did so with a vengeance, authoring "[t]he opinions in the
United States Reports that condemn racist practices in America with
the most candor, care, thoroughness, and passion.""
Finally, it was not surprising that in the Japanese-American Cases
and in Steele, Murphy was the justice who embraced the doctrine of
increased judicial scrutiny for governmental acts that affected "dis-
crete and insular minorities.""2  Chief Justice Stone did not imple-
254. Id. at 354-55.
255. "Convictions" was my term in one of my written questions to Professor Gressman.
256. Letter from Eugene Gressman to MJP (December 31, 1998) (on file with author).
257. Kennedy, supra note 252, at 1245. See also Frank, supra note 14, at 11 ("Murphy's
castigations of 'racism' were part of a larger antipathy to what might be called 'groupism,'
or the practice of holding one member of a group responsible for the independent deeds of
another.").
258. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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ment his own theory, articulated first in his famous Carolene Products'
Footnote 4.9 As Professor Peter Linzer pointed out, Murphy's 1940
opinion in Thornhill v. Alabama,260 a case that struck down an Ala-
bama statute restricting labor picketing on First Amendment grounds,
was "[t]he first use of Footnote Four by the Court. ' 261 Although
Thornhill concerned paragraph one of Footnote Four, while the Japa-
nese-American Cases and Steele concerned paragraph three, the fact is
inescapable that Murphy took footnote four's strict scrutiny sugges-
tion very seriously. Murphy did not hesitate in applying such a strict
standard to these cases, even though he believed that none of these
cases even passed the more deferential "reasonableness" test.262
Stone's failure to apply his own standard is not particularly surprising
either, as "[he] was not always on the same side as the justice citing
the footnote"263 when the footnote was expressly used, let alone when
Footnote 4 tacitly underlied the opposing justice's opinion.
259. While it is true that Murphy did not actually cite to Footnote 4 in any of these
opinions, the obvious relevance of it to these cases is apparent. Indeed, several commenta-
tors have noted the regrettable irony of Stone's decisions, especially in Hirabayashi, with
his authorship of the Footnote. See, e.g., FiNE, Ti WASHINGTON YEARS, supra note 15, at
440; IRONS, supra note 15, at 334.
260. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
261. Peter Linzer, The Carolene Products Footnote and the Preferred Position of Indi-
vidual Rights: Louis Lusky and John Hart Ely vs. Harlan Fiske Stone, 12 CONST. COM-
MENr. 277, 293 (1995).
262. See Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 112 ("It is also true that even the guaranty of equal
protection of the laws allows a measure of reasonable classification. It by no means follows,
however, that there may not be discrimination of such an injurious character in the applica-
tion of laws as to amount to a denial of due process of law as that term is used in the Fifth
Amendment. I think that point is dangerously approached when we have one law for the
majority ofour citizens and another for those of a particular racial heritage."); Korematsu,
323 U.S. at 235 ("In adjudging the military action taken in light of the then apparent dan-
gers, we must not erect too high or too meticulous standards; it is necessary only that the
action have some reasonable relation to the removal of the dangers of invasion, sabotage
and espionage. But the exclusion, either temporarily or permanently, of all persons with
Japanese blood in their veins has no such reasonable relation. And that relation is lacking
because the exclusion order necessarily must rely for its reasonableness upon the assump-
tion that all persons of Japanese ancestry may have a dangerous tendency to commit sabo-
tage and espionage and to aid our Japanese enemy in other ways. It is difficult to believe
that reason, logic or experience could be marshaled in support of such an assumption.");
Endo, 323 U.S. at 307-08 ("As stated more fully in my dissenting opinion in Fred
Toyosaburo Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, racial discrimination of this nature
bears no reasonable relation to military necessity and is utterly foreign to the ideals and
traditions of the American people.").
263. Linzer, supra note 261, at 292-93.
C. Summary: Justice Murphy and the Japanese-American Cases and
Steele
So, by the time the Japanese-American Cases and Steele came
before the Court, Justice Murphy had a wealth of personal and judi-
cial experience to draw upon. Murphy had lived among and worked
closely with Asian peoples while in the Philippines, including those of
Japanese descent. Thus, his opinion was not clouded by stereotypes
about Asians, unlike perhaps Chief Justice Stone's Hirabayashi opin-
ion.2" Instead, Murphy viewed Japanese-Americans in the same light
as he viewed all ethnic minority groups in America: as a vital part of
"the great American experiment" which had always won over its im-
migrant citizens' loyalty "when confronted with the normal attach-
ment of certain groups to the lands of their forefathers." '265 Murphy's
Korematsu dissent makes this point even more explicitly, condemning
General DeWitt's Final Report as an "accumulation of much of the
misinformation, half-truths and insinuations that for years have been
directed against Japanese Americans by people with racial and eco-
264. See, e.g., 320 U.S. at 96 ("There is support for the view that social, economic and
political conditions which have prevailed since the close of the last century, when the Japa-
nese began to come to this country in substantial numbers, have intensified their solidarity
and have in large measure prevented their assimilation as an integral part of the white
population."). As is obvious from this statement, despite the influences of Justices Doug-
las, Reed, and Murphy, Stone's final opinion contained subtle affirmations of stereotypical
views of Japanese-Americans.
265. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 111. As Justice Frankfurter lobbied Murphy not to dis-
sent in Hirabayashi, Murphy responded to one of Frankfurter's notes by stating: "Felix, I
would protect rights on the basis of ancestry. But I would never deny them." FrNm, Tim
WASHNGTON YEARS, supra note 15, at 442.
On the same day Hirabayashi was decided, Murphy's majority opinion in Schneiderman v.
United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943), restored the naturalized citizenship of a Communist
Party official who had been stripped of his status because of his political activities. Murphy
echoed this same belief in the American diverse union theory:
We are directly concerned only with the rights of this petitioner and the circum-
stances surrounding his naturalization, but we should not overlook the fact that
we are a heterogeneous people. In some of our larger cities a majority of the
school children are the offspring of parents only one generation, if that far, re-
moved from the steerage of the immigrant ship, children of those who sought
refuge in the new world from the cruelty and oppression of the old, where men
have been burned at the stake, imprisoned, and driven into exile in countless
numbers for their political and religious beliefs. Here they have hoped to achieve
a political status as citizens in a free world in which men are privileged to think
and act and speak according to their convictions, without fear of punishment or
further exile so long as they keep the peace and obey the law.
320 U.S. at 120. Stone dissented from this opinion. Mr. Pickering noted this: "Murphy
and Stone were completely at odds in the citizen denaturalization case, Schneiderman v.
U.S. Murphy had a much more expansive approach to the concept of liberty in the 5th and
14th Amendments than did Stone, especially in time of war." E-mail from John H. Picker-
ing to MJP (March 17, 1999) (on file with author).
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nomic prejudices '266 and concluding that the "questionable racial and
sociological grounds '267 relied upon by DeWitt did not prove "a rea-
sonable relation between the group characteristics of Japanese Ameri-
cans and the dangers of invasion, sabotage and espionage. "268
Moreover, as Professor Gressman discussed, "Murphy's back-
ground was such that he could fairly appraise the merits of a military
viewpoint. '269 Murphy had served in the Army during World War I,
trained for active service during the summer of 1942, and had been
involved in many matters of important military consequence during
his time in the Philippines:
These experiences, plus his service in the Cabinet during 1939
and his close relationship with President Roosevelt, gave him
more than an ordinary layman's idea of matters which might af-
fect the military security of the nation. He was therefore able to
combine his devotion to civil liberties with a considerable under-
standing of military affairs. Refusing to accept blindly the judg-
ments of military authorities where the Bill of Rights was
infringed, he calmly brought to bear on these war-born issues an
independent, informed intellect. 7 °
Thus, Justice Murphy was not bedazzled by General DeWitt's au-
thority or expertise. He refused to defer his better judgment to De-
Witt, a man who had testified in 1942 before a congressional
committee that "[a] Jap's a Jap. It makes no difference whether he's
an American citizen or not. There is no way to determine their loy-
alty."271 Murphy saw the virulent racism behind DeWitt's military or-
ders, and by Korematsu and Endo, Murphy refused to lend his name
to the Court's imprimatur upholding the West Coast wartime
measures.
Similarly, his relationship with the African-American community
and his lifelong crusade to ensure their equal protection of law almost
certainly colored the passion with which he wrote his concurrence in
Steele. Murphy had seen plenty of "utter disregard for the dignity and
266. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 239.
267. Id. at 236.
268. Id. at 239.
269. Gressman, A Preliminary Appraisal, supra note 13, at 37. Another example of this
is found Justice Murphy's dissent in Falbo v. U.S., 320 U.S. 549, 561 (1944). The Court
affirmed a Jehovah's Witness minister's conviction for refusal to obey an order of a local
draft board to report for assignment to work of national importance. Murphy's lone dis-
sent concluded: "The law knows no finer hour than when it cuts through formal concepts
and transitory emotions to protect unpopular citizens against discrimination and
persecution."
270. Gressman, A Preliminary Appraisal, supra note 13, at 37.
271. NEwMAN, supra note 53, at 313.
well-being of colored citizens" 72 in his day and wanted the "ugly ex-
ample[s] of economic cruelty against [African-Americans]" ' 73 at issue
in Steele condemned by the Court on the strongest possible grounds.
Just as he had done as judge, mayor, governor, and attorney general,
Murphy sought to help vulnerable people "so out of luck and [who]
get the worst of every deal."2 74
And, finally, the Justice's first-hand experience witnessing and ex-
ercising the vast power of the federal government raised Murphy's
awareness of the need to protect the civil rights and liberties of all
Americans. His own civil rights and liberties were arguably violated
by Hoover's secret file and by the Dies Committee's one-sided hear-
ings in 1938. Moreover, as U.S. Attorney General, even Murphy had
authorized federal surveillance techniques, such as finger-printing and
wiretapping, that arguably violated other citizens' civil rights and lib-
erties. One can speculate that Justice Murphy, reflecting on his own
experiences, could have no doubt that ethnic and racial minorities
needed just as much protection from federal violations of their civil
rights and liberties - provided out of necessity by the Fifth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause - as they did from state governments as
provided by the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
Thus, his use of such a doctrine to denounce in Hirabayashi and strike
down in Korematsu and Endo General DeWitt's racially discrimina-
tory orders and, further, Murphy's call to constitutionally condemn
the Locomotive Brotherhood's federally-sanctioned racism in Steele
were merely par for the course, a course which Frank Murphy fol-
lowed throughout his entire public career.
V. Conclusion
"I'm not sure that Justice Murphy thought much about the Fifth
Amendment having reversely incorporated an equal protection com-
ponent. That notion did not come about until Boiling v. Sharpe, in
1954. And I recall that equal protection analysis was practically non-
existent in the 1940s. But if you find some of the early doctrinal be-ginnings in Murphy's Hirabayashi or Korematsu opinions, you would
be doing a great service to a long-neglected Justice."27 5
In many ways, this quote from Professor Gressman, Justice Frank
Murphy's longest serving law clerk at the Court and among his most
272. 323 U.S. at 208.
273. Id at 209.
274. FrNE, THE DERorr YEARS, supra note 189, at 179.
275. Letter from Eugene Gressman to MJP (March 20, 1998) (on file with author).
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devoted admirers, sums up the point of this entire article. Even Pro-
fessor Gressman, who knew Justice Murphy intimately and has writ-
ten extensively about him, never quite recognized - as no other
judicial opinion or academic commentator has - the wonderful contri-
bution his Justice made to the doctrine adopted in Bolling v. Sharpe.
It is probably true that, like Professor Gressman observed, Murphy
did not actually think much about Fifth Amendment Equal Protec-
tion. Nor is it necessary to say that Murphy was the only justice to
write on this issue or that he was a great pioneer in this field. At the
same time, however, Justice Murphy's basic sense of right and wrong -
symbolized in his Japanese-American Cases and Steele opinions - per-
haps unknowingly but nevertheless importantly contributed to the di-
alogue about a doctrine that has evolved into an imperative protection
for all Americans from their national government's excesses. Al-
though his regrettable Hirabayashi concurrence was rightfully called
"[t]he one discordant note in Murphy's opposition to racism,' 2 76 it
was a critical part of a series of opinions which "pointed the way to
the adoption by the Court of the doctrine of fifth amendment equal
protection. 27 7 Such recognition seems well-deserved for "a long-ne-
glected Justice" like Frank Murphy.
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